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ABSTRACT
This article conducts the very first empirical study exploring the
contractual arrangements of Chinese hedge funds, which are
organized not as limited partnerships but as trusts. Using 139 trust
contracts collected by hand, this article sheds light on the structure,
covenants, and compensation mechanisms used by “sunshine funds,”
the local name for hedge funds in China. It shows that, while
sunshine funds do have similar contractual arrangements as typical
LP-organized hedge funds, they also possess many undeniable
differences due to the jurisdiction-specific characteristics of China.
In particular, because of the direct involvement of trust companies,
sunshine funds include certain covenants and terms that could both
narrow the decision-making power and dampen the incentives of
investment advisers. New, but rapidly developing, sunshine funds
have been frequently targeted by regulatory efforts, which, however,
come at a low level of consistency and sometimes lack in-depth
consideration. Growing out of gray regulatory areas, Chinese
sunshine fund managers have demonstrated remarkable competence
in positioning themselves by taking advantage of favorable
regulations and mitigating the impact of unfavorable ones. Looking
ahead, it is of key importance that a proper balance is reached in
terms of what role regulators should play in dealing with the Chinese
hedge fund industry.
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INTRODUCTION
Although lacking a legal or regulatory definition, the term “hedge
fund” usually describes a type of alternative investment vehicle that
possesses four general characteristics: (1) it is a pooled, privately
organized fund; (2) it is administered by professional investment
managers; (3) it is not widely available to the public; and (4) it operates
outside of securities regulation and registration requirements.1 Although
many private equity or venture capital (“VC”) funds also share these
characteristics, those funds are distinguishable because they invest in
unlisted portfolio companies for relatively long-term periods for the
purpose of securing lucrative exits afterwards. As a class, however,
hedge funds can embark upon a broad range of investments including
equities, debt and commodities. They are often associated with using
active trading strategies and employing sophisticated instruments (most
notably short-selling and derivatives) to hedge investment risks and
increase returns. Most of the time, hedge funds tend to focus on trading
publicly-listed securities; in recent years, however, they also have
invested through side pockets into those assets that are comparatively
illiquid or hard-to-value, 2 thus indirectly broadening their coverage
further to private markets. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that
there is a wide range of variations among hedge funds, and while some
hedge funds do share some or all of these characteristics, others do not.
Every hedge fund has its own investment strategy that determines the
type and method of investment it undertakes. As a result, it is easier to
recognize hedge funds than it is to define them.3
Due to strong economic growth while major developed countries
suffered from the global recession, China recently surpassed Japan to

1. Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial
Innovation, in BROOKINGS-NOMURA PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 23 (Yasuki
Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/paper=931254.
2. Houman B. Shadab, Coming Together After the Crisis: Global Convergence of
Private Equity and Hedge Funds, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 603, 608 (2009).
3. Hedge Fund Standards Board, The Hedge Fund Sector: History and Present
Context, HFSB.ORG, http://www.hfsb.org/sites/10109/files/what_is_a_hedge_fund.pdf
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
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become the world’s second-largest economy.4 The value of the Chinese
stock market has boomed. From a marketplace with only twelve stocks
trading when its first two stock exchanges opened in 1990 in Shanghai
and Shenzhen,5 the combined value of companies with stocks traded on
China’s equities markets is now comparable to that of Japan’s,
surpassing the latter periodically during the past two or three years. 6
Furthermore, the long-anticipated margin trading 7 and stock index

4. David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2010, at B1.
5. Bai Haiyan, Ziben shichang fazhan dui gongsi zhili de zuoyong [The Impact of
the Development of Capital Markets over Corporate Governance], 22 ZHONGGUO
JINGMAO [CHINESE BUS. UPDATE] 83, 83 (2008).
6. The combined value of companies trading on China’s equities markets reached
US$3.09 trillion as of August 16, 2010, compared with US$3.51 trillion for Japan,
according to data compiled by Bloomberg News. See China to Surpass Japan as No. 2
Stock Market, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 17, 2010, available at http://business.financial
post.com/2010/08/17/china-to-surpass-japan-as-no-2-stock-market/#ixzz0xRYgQnER.
China briefly surpassed Japan by capitalization in January 2008, shortly after
PetroChina Co. debuted in Shanghai, and again in July 2009 as a consequence of the
government’s 4 trillion-yuan (US$587 billion) economic stimulus program directed at
infrastructure projects and shares.
7. Margin trading was officially legalized in June 2006 by Zhengquan gongsi
rongzi rongquan yewu shidian guanli banfa [Measures for the Administration of Pilot
Securities Lending and Borrowing Business of Securities Companies] (promulgated by
China Securities Regulatory Commission [hereinafter CSRC], June 30, 2006),
LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com, but only materialized on
Mar. 19, 2010 when the CSRC designated six securities brokerage firms as the first
batch of “trial firms” to begin the business of margin trading and securities lending.
Mainland China Securities Survey 2010 (KPMG China, Hong Kong), Sep. 2010, at 6,
available at http://www.kpmg.com/cn/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Page
s/China-securities-survey-201010.aspx. The day before the official launch of the trial
program, CITIC Securities signed an agreement with Jiangsu Winfast Investment and
Development Co. Ltd., offering the latter credit limits of RMB 28 million for margin
trading and RMB 10 million for short selling. This is considered to be the very first of
such transactions in China. See Hu Yang, China Begins Margin Trading Trial, CHINA
DAILY, Mar. 31, 2010, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201003/31/content_9668589.htm. Jiangsu Winfast is a securities asset management
company, and has several sunshine funds (one type of Chinese hedge funds) under its
management. See Jiangsu Winfast Investment Holding Grp., Company Profile,
http://www.jiangsuruihua.com/en/article.asp?c_id=42 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011);
Jiangsu Winfast Investment Holding Grp., Securities Trust Schemes Issued by Winfast,
http://www.jiangsuruihua.com/en/article.asp?c_id=56 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
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futures8 finally materialized in the spring of 2010, so it is now possible
to get credit quotas for margin trading and short-selling from approved
securities brokerage firms, and to trade Shanghai-Shenzhen 300 stock
index futures contracts. These technical developments, combined with
considerable market capitalization and strong economic growth,
demonstrate China’s great potential to become an important hedge fund
market.
Nonetheless, a “hedge fund” is still a very novel concept in China.
Given that Chinese people’s familiarity with hedge funds is somewhat
limited to anecdotal knowledge,9 the apparent existence of the Chinese
hedge fund industry is ambiguous. Among other things, this ambiguity
partially results from the general aversion in China towards the phrase
“hedge funds,” due to the negative impression they left on South-eastern
Asian countries in the 1997 Asian financial crisis,10 and more recently,

8. Financial derivatives (specifically, futures) were officially legalized in March
2007 by Qihuo jiaoyi guanli tiaoli [Regulation on the Administration of Futures
Trading] (promulgated by the State Council, Mar. 16, 2007), LAWINFOCHINA, available
at http://www.lawinfochina.com, but only materialized in April 2010 when the
Shanghai-Shenzhen 300 stock index futures contracts, the very first of such in China,
were listed on the China Financial Futures Exchange. See Mainland China Securities
Survey 2010, supra note 7, at 8.
9. For a collection of anecdotal articles on hedge funds in China, see generally
Richard Wilson, China – Hedge Funds: Guide to Hedge Funds in China,
HEDGEFUNDBLOGGER.COM, http://richard-wilson.blogspot.com/2008/05/china-hedgefunds-hedge-funds-in-china.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
10. Hedge funds have been charged with playing a pivotal role in the 1997-98
Asian financial crisis due to their involvement in large transactions they have done in
various Asian currency markets, such as Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and then
Hong Kong, South Korea, etc. In particular, the then Prime Minister of Malaysia
blamed hedge fund manager George Soros for “attacks in the marketplace on the
Malaysian ringgit and other currencies in order to generate profits for themselves
without regard to the livelihood of the Malaysian or other local people.” See DICK K.
NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE 1997-98 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS (1998),
available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crs-asia2.htm; see also Barry Eichengreen &
Donald Mathieson, Hedge Funds, What Do We Really Know?, ECON ISSUES No. 19,
International Monetary Fund (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs
/ft/issues/issues19/index.htm#5. However, it is also submitted that despite these
allegations, there is no empirical evidence that George Soros, or any other hedge fund
managers, were responsible for the crisis. See Stephen J. Brown et al., Hedge Funds
and the Asian Currency Crisis, 26 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 95 (2000).
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accusations against them in the 2008 global financial crisis.11 As such, it
would be unwise and difficult for private investment managers to raise a
fund in China under a name that the public generally associates with a
negative image. Rather, the hedge-fund-like investment vehicles are
referred to as “sunshine privately offered funds,” 12 which can sound
quite odd to outsiders. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to these funds
as “sunshine funds” in this article.
Another important factor contributing to the dearth of information
on Chinese hedge funds is their unique organizational structure. In the
United States, which has the world’s most developed hedge fund
industry, 13 the limited partnership (“LP”) prevails as the prevalent
business form for a hedge fund.14 On the one hand, fund managers act as
general partners, actively managing the fund and bearing unlimited
liability.15 On the other hand, investors are passive limited partners who
11. The financial crisis of 2008 has led to renewed debate about the impact of
hedge funds on the functioning of financial markets. Although it is largely recognized
that hedge funds should not be blamed for causing the crisis, there seems to be a
consensus among regulators in the world that they should be more regulated, which is
arguably stems more from a political fear for being criticized if no scapegoat can be
spotted rather than from a real need. See Anne C. Rivière, The Future of Hedge Fund
Regulation: A Comparative Approach: United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy,
and Germany, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 291 (2011).
12. The term “sunshine privately offered funds” is a literal translation of the
corresponding Chinese. For a brief introduction of sunshine funds, see
http://www.asimu.com/knowledge/infocontent/1238/41297.html. Because this type of
fund uses a trust to raise capital from investors and then manages the raised capital for
them, they are legal and thus “under the sunshine.” In contrast, those funds that do not
use the trust form may face various challenges such as ambiguous legal status, thus they
operate “in the shadow.” Therefore, this name is actually a vivid depiction of those
privately offered funds, using the trust as their business form, and primarily focusing on
investing in publicly listed securities. Sunshine funds, particularly the unstructured ones
(further discussion in Part II.B), are considered comparable to hedge funds, in that that
they both aim to pursue absolute returns and have similar fee structures. See
http://www.crctrust.com/cgi-bin/web/TemplateAction?catalogNo=ywgl,smzs.
13. As of the end of 2009, the US was the largest management center for hedge
funds and also the leading location for management of hedge fund assets with over twothirds of the total. See International Financial Services London, IFSL Research Hedge
Funds 2010, THECITYUK.com, (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.thecityuk.com
/assets/Uploads/Hedge-funds-2010.pdf.
14. DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 88 (2008).
15. Jacob Preiserowicz, The New Regulatory Regime for Hedge Funds: Has the
SEC Gone Down the Wrong Path?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 807, 812 (2005). In
practice, however, the “actual” general partner of a fund is often not the fund manager
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are shielded with limited liability protection but have to leave
investment decisions to general partners. 16 One important feature
common to virtually all LP-type hedge funds is their fee structure,
typically consisting of a management fee of 2% and a performance fee
of 20%.17 This structure heavily incentivizes managers to generate good
performance for investors. In contrast, no Chinese hedge fund was
formed as a LP until March 2010, when the first LP-type private
securities investment fund was created in Beijing. 18 Although limited
partnerships have been legally authorized in China since 2007,19 only 31
private securities investment funds were identified as LPs as of the end
of 2011.20 Arguably, the low usage of LPs among Chinese hedge funds
may be a result of the fact that there are virtually no precedents available
to regulators, practitioners, and taxation authorities on how to deal with
this new business form.21
itself, but a management company set up by it. By doing this, fund managers are
shielded by the limited liability protection of the management company, thus leaving
the unlimited liability at the entity level. See infra notes 15, 28 and accompanying text.
16. Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1735 (2008).
17. Id.
18. Zhao Juan & Hu Zhongbin, Shouge hehuozhi zhengquan simu jijin tanmi
[Exploring the First Privately Offered Partnership Securities Fund], JINGJI GUANCHA
BAO [THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER], Mar. 13, 2010, available at http://www.eeo.com.
cn/finance/securities/2010/03/13/165159.shtml. This first partnership fund is named
Yinhe Purun, and is registered in Beijing.
19. Limited partnership was first legally permitted in 2006, when China amended
its Partnership Enterprise Law. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hehuo qiye fa
[Partnership Enterprise Law (P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb.
23, 1997) (amended Aug. 27, 2006) (took effect June 1, 2007), LAWINFOCHINA,
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com.
20. According to the database provided by Simuwang.com, a total of 11 funds were
set up as limited partnerships for the entire year of 2010, and 20 funds for the entire
year of 2011. See http://data.simuwang.com/product.php (follow “product type”; then
select limited partnership; next choose 2010 and 2011 from under “year established”).
21. It is submitted that in order to enhance the popularity of limited partnership
among privately offered securities investment funds, four difficult questions need to be
tackled first. Among other things, it remains to be seen (1) whether these LP-organized
funds will be equally attractive to investors when there is no trust company involved;
(2) how LP-organized funds are going to properly entertain frequent subscription and
redemption needs, given the statutory requirement for unanimous approval from all
partners and changing official registration with the regulatory authorities when an
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Instead of the LP form, the vast majority of Chinese hedge funds
are created as securities investment trust plans based on a “four party
cooperation platform” provided by various trust companies.22 This might
explain the impression that China seems to lack a hedge fund industry –
after all, these trust-like funds look quite different from the much better
known LP-type funds. The very first trust-organized sunshine fund in
China was created in 2004,23 yet the industry has been developing at a
remarkable pace ever since. According to the Go-Goal Database for
High-End Investors, there are altogether 703 trust sunshine funds in
operation as of August 9, 2010, and the number increases to 838 when
including those that had been terminated. 24 Although it is undisputed
that China’s hedge fund industry still has a long way to go, it seems
equally unwarranted to simply deny its existence when a large number
of funds are already in the business. Given the limited understanding of
these trust sunshine funds, timely research into them is both worthwhile
and practicable.
Just as LP agreements provide insight into the creation and
governance of American hedge funds, the best way to understand how
Chinese sunshine funds are established and operated is to look at their
“trust agreements for collective securities investment funds.”
Fortunately, while hedge funds in developed markets are generally

existing partner exits or a new partner is brought into the partnership; (3) how they are
going to safely keep and use the money from investors when the Partnership Enterprise
Law does not make mandatory a custodian bank to be designated for that purpose; and
(4) which governmental authority should be supervising LP-organized sunshine funds.
Moreover, many questions also remain unanswered as to the taxation of limited
partnerships and their investors and managers. See Xiao Yongjie, Yangguang simu
youxian hehuo zhi sida nanti [Four Difficulties for Sunshine Funds Organized as
Limited Partnerships], ZHENGQUAN SHIBAO [SECURITIES TIMES], Mar. 15, 2010,
available at http://simu.howbuy.com/xinwen/178846.html.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. This fund was called SZITIC PureHeart, created on Feb. 20, 2004 in Shenzhen
and terminated on Jan. 15, 2008. The fund is reported to have realized an accumulated
return of 370.86% as of its liquidation. See Zhang Bin, Zhao Danyang: Shangwu huigui
A gu shichang de jihua [Zhao Danyang: Currently No Plan to Return to a Stock
Market], CAIJING, Feb. 18, 2009, available at http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-0218/110071131.html.
24. See GO-GOAL DATABASE FOR HIGH-END INVESTORS, http://www.gogoal.com/inv_trust/basic/default.aspx. See infra Part III for further discussion of
empirical data. Sunshine funds were filtered out manually by the author on the website
provided.
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considered quite secretive due to the much lighter regulation and
disclosure requirements imposed on them, the trust-like sunshine funds
are somewhat more transparent because trust companies in China are
subject to certain disclosure requirements as supervised and regulated
financial institutions.25 In addition, some fund managers also voluntarily
publish information on their websites about the funds they manage. As a
result, it is possible to obtain the trust contracts of some Chinese hedge
funds. Using a sample of 139 trust agreements and explanations of trust
plans,26 this article investigates the contractual arrangements of Chinese
sunshine funds and aims to demonstrate how the salient terms of these
trust plans govern the operation of sunshine funds. Particular attention
will be given to those terms that control the roles of investment advisers
and trust companies, who cooperate and interact with each other in a
manner analogous to fund managers in American hedge funds contracts.
Part I of this article provides a brief summary of the contractual and
governance structure of American LP-type hedge funds, together with
an overview of previous research papers written on the contractual
arrangements of alternative private investment vehicles. Part II describes
the current regulatory environment surrounding hedge funds in China.
Finally, Part III discusses and analyzes empirical data regarding the
structure, covenants, and compensation mechanisms of sunshine funds.

25. Generally, trust companies must disclose to their clients and the relevant
interested parties the key information about their business. For a collective capital trust
plan, they must, at least for every quarter of a year, create a “trust capital management
report” to disclose the major issues in managing the trust. They must also disclose
weekly on their websites the unit net asset value of each of their securities investment
trusts (such as sunshine funds). See art. 34-38 of Xintuo gongsi jihe zijin xintuo jihua
guanli banfa [Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by
Trust Companies] (promulgated by the CBRC, Jan. 23, 2007), LAWINFOCHINA,
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com; see also art. 15-17 of Xintuo gongsi
zhengquan touzi xintuo yewu caozuo zhiyin [Guidelines on Running the Business of
Securities Investment Trusts by Trust Companies], (promulgated by the CBRC on Jan.
23, 2009), LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com.
26. See infra Part III.A.
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CONTRACTUAL AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF HEDGE
FUNDS

A. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AS THE PREVALENT BUSINESS FORM IN
PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUND INDUSTRY
LPs are widely used to contain the business of both hedge funds
and private equity funds. The popularity of the LP in the private
investment fund industry can be attributed to two primary incentives:
flexible contractual structure and favorable tax benefits. Limited
partners are those persons contributing substantially all of the
partnership’s capital, such as institutional investors, wealthy
individuals,27 and sometimes other hedge funds (giving rise to the fund
of funds).28 The general partner is a management company set up by
professional investment managers, who are effectively shielded from the
risk of unlimited personal liability arising as a result of actively
managing the partnership and making investment decisions on the
pooled capital.29 Unlike a corporation, LPs are not separately taxed as
an entity, so that the fund’s profits and losses are passed through to its
partners without any entity level tax.30 Compared to limited partners, the
general partner only contributes a nominal portion of the total
assets/committed capital of the partnership, normally 1%,31 but has the
right of compensation much greater than its original contribution if the
fund runs well. Such compensation is often referred to as the “2-20”
mechanism, consisting of a fixed management fee, usually 2% of the
total assets/committed capital of the fund, and a performance-based right
to share 20% of the fund’s net profits. 32 Such an arrangement serves to
incentivize the general partner to work hard and manage investments
diligently, providing an effective solution to the principal-agent problem.

27. JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS, REVISED AND UPDATED
EDITION 16-17 (2005).
28. Id. at 39. See also Jacob Preiserowicz, supra note 15, at 811.
29. Id. at 40.
30. NAVENDU P. VASAVADA, TAXATION OF U.S. INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND
HEDGE FUNDS: ACCOUNTING POLICIES, TAX ALLOCATIONS, AND PERFORMANCE
PRESENTATION 5 (2010).
31. Simon Friedman, Partnership Capital Accounts and Their Discontents, 2
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 791, 798 (2006).
32. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private
Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008); see also Friedman, supra note 31.
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The governance structures of a typical private equity fund and hedge
fund are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below.
Particularly, the compensation scheme in hedge fund partnership
agreements is usually identified by one important feature: high-water
marks. By definition, a high-water mark is the highest peak in value that
an investment fund has reached. 33 As already mentioned above, such
performance-based compensation normally amounts to 20% of the net
new profits if the previous high water mark is exceeded. The prevalence
of high-water marks among hedge funds might be partially explained by
the high level of reliance on fund manager expertise. Since investor
payoff is presumably based more upon the expectation of superior
managerial skill and less upon the expected returns to an
undifferentiated or passively managed portfolio of assets, a mechanism
is needed to incentivize fund managers to demonstrate their skills in
order to justify their fees.34

33. William N. Goetzmann et al., High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund
Management Contracts, 58 J. FIN. 1685, 1685 (2003).
34. Id. at 1686.
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Governance Structures of Private Equity Funds and Hedge Funds
Figure 1
Private Equity Fund

Principals
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Limited Partnership

General
Partner

Carried
Interests
(20% Profits)

Disposal
Proceeds

Investments

Portfolio
Companies

Adapted from McCahery & Vermeulen (2008).35

35.

JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY & ERIK P. M. VERMEULEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
187 (2008).

OF NON-LISTED COMPANIES
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Figure 2
Hedge Fund

Principals

Investors
(Limited
Partners)
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Account
Adapted from McCahery & Vermeulen (2008).36

Despite a certain level of similarity between the two diagrams
above, hedge funds differ from private equity funds in that hedge funds
generally invest in public liquid assets via a brokerage account, whereas
private equity funds typically purchase stock directly in non-listed
portfolio companies. As such, hedge funds need an array of service
providers working around them in order to maintain their operations.
Figure 3, below, lists the typical parties involved in the operation of
hedge funds. Specifically, an administrator is appointed to maintain
records, as well as to independently verify the asset value of the fund. A
registrar/transfer agent is responsible for processing subscriptions and
redemptions and maintaining the registry of shareholders. A prime
broker provides access to stock and loan financing and serves as a host

36.

Id. at 186.
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of value-added services.37 A custodian ensures the safe-keeping of assets.
At the top level, the board of directors or trustee of the fund bears a
fiduciary duty to the investors to ensure that all parties involved in the
fund properly carry out their respective tasks. 38 It is submitted that
outsourcing a hedge fund’s functions can help to minimize the risk of
collusion among hedge fund participants to perpetuate fraud, and may
also mitigate liability in the event that hedge fund participants are
accused of improperly performing their management duties.39
Figure 3
Typical Service Providers for a Hedge Fund

Source: Cumming & Dai (2010)40

37. Douglas J. Cumming & Na Dai, A Law and Finance Analysis of Hedge Funds,
39 FIN. MGMT. 997, 1001 (2010).
38. Id. at 1001–1003.
39. See Cumming & Dai, supra note 37.
40. Id.
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B. COVENANTS IN HEDGE FUND PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS – HOW
CAN THE CORRESPONDING LITERATURE ON PRIVATE EQUITY
FUNDS BE HELPFUL?
Although both private equity and hedge funds employ the same
legal structure and “2-20” compensation mechanism from the outset,
there are also pronounced differences between them in terms of their
operations. Such differences result from the contractual flexibility of
limited partnerships, which allows investors and fund managers to enter
into covenants and schemes to suit their respective investment
mandates.41 A straightforward example in this regard is differing fund
terms. Since investments by private equity funds are generally highly
illiquid42—private equity funds focus on buying shares in unlisted firms
and only hope to harvest from there after three to seven years.43 There is
a need to agree on a limited fund term at the expiration of which the
general partner is obliged to return to limited partners the capital
together with distributed profits. Correspondingly, general partners
cannot access the full amount of the committed capital from the
beginning of the fund, but they have the right to call in capital
contributions once they have located proper investment projects.44 Once
the capital is invested, limited partners then need to remain patient and
are prohibited from redeeming their partnership units until the end of the
fund. In contrast, because hedge funds primarily invest in publicly listed
securities, their assets are comparatively more liquid and investors can
get back their contributed capital through periodically-opened
redemptions. This explains why many hedge funds are perpetual in life
rather than having a fixed fund term, and why limited partners have to
make contributions up front.
While an in-depth comparison of the difference between the two
types of funds is beyond the scope of this article, it is nevertheless
necessary and inspiring to bring up the topic here. As mentioned in the
41.
42.

See MCCAHERY & VERMEULEN, supra note 35, at 172.
Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidence
from Private Equity, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 7 (2004).
43. Douglas Cumming & Uwe Walz, Private Equity Returns and Disclosure
Around the World, 41 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 727, 728 (2010).
44. Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance of Private Equity
Funds, 22 REV. FINANC. STUD. 1747, 1750 (2009).
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Introduction, a good way to understand how hedge funds are set up and
operated is to look at their contracts, either LP agreements for typical
American-style hedge funds or trust agreements for Chinese sunshine
funds. Given the many similarities between private equity and hedge
funds in terms of organizational structure and compensation
mechanisms, a look into the contractual arrangements (covenants in
particular) of private equity LP agreements will provide helpful
guidance in understanding the contractual arrangements of hedge funds,
which, however, have received scant attention in literature. The lack of
literature on hedge fund contractual arrangements might result from the
difficulty of obtaining access to the organizational documents of hedge
funds; but it is more likely explained by the fact that hedge funds tend to
rely much less on self-regulatory means like covenants due to shorter
lock-up periods and the fund’s liquidity. Furthermore, those hedge fund
activities that fall within the public domain, particularly in the market
for corporate control, can also help to limit the principal-agent problems
that may otherwise emerge. 45 The following paragraphs summarize
important research on contractual covenants in the agreements of private
investment funds, including both private equity funds, as well as venture
capital funds, one of the most important subtypes of private equity.
Although this information might not be directly useful in terms of
drawing conclusions for this paper given the different topics and
jurisdictions covered in this area, exploring methods of classifying
covenants may be a good starting point for classifying the covenant
arrangements in Chinese hedge funds.
In their 1996 paper, Professors Gompers and Lerner studied
covenants in a sample of 140 U.S. VC partnership agreements.46 They
focused on 14 classes of covenants, which were divided into three broad
families: (a) covenants relating to overall fund management; (b)
covenants relating to activities of general partners; and (c) covenants
restricting the types of investment. 47 According to them, contractual
restrictiveness in VC funds, measured by the number and kind of
covenants in the partnership agreement, is determined by two important
factors, namely, the supply and demand conditions in the VC market, as

45.
46.

See MCCAHERY & VERMEULEN, supra note 35, at 190.
See Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical
Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1996).
47. Id. at 480.
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well as the variations of the cost of contracting.48 When the supply of
capital is large and the demand for the services of experienced,
professional VC managers is great, fewer covenants are observed, and
general partners’ compensation under the partnership agreement is
higher.49 Such supply and demand theory is generally supported by all
types of covenants.50 In terms of variations in the cost of contracting, the
rationale is that because negotiating and monitoring specific covenants
can be costly, and the ease of monitoring and the potential of engaging
in opportunistic behavior may vary across funds, more restrictive
contracts will be employed when monitoring is easier and the potential
for opportunistic behavior is greater. 51 Such theory is supported
particularly by those covenants restricting the fund management and
investment activities.52
In Europe, Daniel Schmidt and Mark Wahrenburg explored factors
that influence the design of financing contracts in terms of covenant
restrictions and compensation schemes between VC investors and
European VC funds. 53 Their analyses focused on the impact of VC
funds’ reputations and changes in the overall demand for VC services.54
While conventional wisdom would assume established market
participants care more about their reputation and have less incentive to
behave opportunistically, thus requiring fewer covenant restrictions,
their findings show that established funds are actually more severely
restricted by contractual covenants. 55 Moreover, empirical results also
show that established fund managers with stronger reputations are more
often obligated to make a capital contribution than first-time fund
managers.56 Such results indicate that when established funds care less
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 470.
See id. at 488.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 493.
See Daniel Schmidt & Mark Wahrenburg, Contractual Relations Between
European VC Funds and Investors: The Impact of Bargaining Power and Reputation
on Contractual Design (Risk Capital and the Financing of European Initiative Firms,
Working Paper No. 8, 2004), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/fmg/research/RICAFE
/pdf/RICAFE-WP08-Schmidt.pdf.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 3-4.
56. Id. at 4.
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about their reputation, stronger performance-related incentives may be
concurrently used with more restrictive covenants in order to prevent
opportunism. 57 With respect to the effects of VC supply on contract
design, Schmidt and Wahrenburg’s conclusion is opposite to that in
Gompers and Lerner’s 1996 paper, in that Schmidt and Wahrenburg find
that VC funds receive less base compensation and higher performancerelated compensation in years with strong capital flows into the VC
industry.58 They interpreted such finding as a signal of overconfidence:
strong investor demand seems to coincide with overoptimistic
expectations by fund managers, which makes them willing to accept
higher powered incentive schemes.59
A later paper by Douglas Cumming and Sofia Johan in 2006,
broadened the study by introducing an international dataset on
covenants in contracts of private equity and VC funds outside the US.60
They divided the covenants into five groups on the basis of Gompers
and Lerner (1996), but incorporated, among other things, necessary
changes to reflect the structure of non-U.S. funds that may be organized
in various legal forms other than the LP. The five groups were: (a)
authority of the fund manager regarding investment decisions; (b)
restrictions on the fund manager’s investment powers; (c) types of
investment; (d) fund operation; and (e) limitation of liability of the fund
manager.61 Their central hypothesis is that the frequency of covenants is
influenced by the quality of law of the country in which the fund is
legally registered. Related to this central hypothesis, they also proposed
that the frequency of covenants is influenced by the presence of legally
trained fund managers. 62 They observed a statistically significant
positive relation between the quality of a country’s laws and the number
of covenants pertaining to fund operation (such as the sale of fund
interests, restrictions on fund raising, and matters pertaining to public
disclosure).63 Compared with the same amount of improvement in the

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 4.
See Schmidt & Warenburg, supra note 53.
Douglas J. Cumming & Sofia A. Johan, Is it the Law or the Lawyers?
Investment Covenants Around the World, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 535 (2006).
61. Id. 539-41.
62. Id. at 537.
63. Id.
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Legality index64 among developed countries, such improvement in the
Legality index among developing countries leads to a greater probability
of including an extra covenant pertaining to fund operation. 65 With
respect to legally-trained fund managers, a 20% increase of fund
managers with legal training increases the probability of additional
covenants pertaining both to investment decisions (such as the size of
any single investment and co-investment) and types of investment (for
different asset classes) by approximately 10%. 66 Taken together,
Cumming and Johan concluded that while law and lawyers are both
important, the presence of lawyers has a more economically significant
impact on the use of covenants than the legal environment itself.67
II.

OVERVIEW OF CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
CHINESE HEDGE FUNDS

A. ALTERNATIVE FORMS FOR HEDGE FUNDS IN CHINA OTHER THAN
SUNSHINE FUNDS
Before proceeding further, it is worthwhile to point out that the socalled “sunshine privately offered funds” are not the only way to
structure hedge funds under the relevant Chinese laws and regulations.
The name “sunshine funds” typically refer to those funds organized as
trusts and managed by private investment advisory/management firms.
In addition to them, there are several other possible alternatives.
First, securities brokerage firms 68 and public fund management
companies69 can, upon approval from the China Securities Regulatory
64. For the definition and derivation of the Legality index, see Daniel Berkowitz et
al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUROPEAN ECON.
REV. 165 (2003).
65. Id. at 567.
66. Id. at 568-69.
67. Id. at 571.
68. Zhengquan gongsi kehu zichan guanli yewu shixing banfa [Trial
Implementation Measures for Client Asset Management Business of Securities
Companies] (promulgated by the CSRC, Dec. 18, 2003), LAWINFOCHINA, available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com; Zhengquan gongsi jihe zichan guanli yewu shishi xize
(shixing) [Detailed Rules for Implementation of Collective Asset Management Business
of Securities Companies (for Trial Implementation)] (promulgated by the CSRC, May
31, 2008), ST. COUNCIL GAZ. (P.R.C.).
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Commission (“CSRC”), China’s securities market watchdog, engage in
the asset management business by pooling capital from high-end
investors, and creating and managing their own investment funds.70 This
being said, nothing in the law prevents them from resorting to the four
party cooperation model71 provided by trust companies to form trust-like
funds. 72 In such a case, they will act as the third-party investment
adviser to the trust fund.
Second, trust companies are also allowed to pool capital by creating
“collective capital trust plans” and attracting qualified investors to invest
therein.73 If a private investment advisory/management firm asks a trust
company to set up such a collective trust plan and to appoint the firm as
the investment adviser for the capital pooled thereunder, a sunshine
hedge fund can be so created. Of course, a trust company can also
choose not to retain any third-party investment adviser and manage the
fund relying wholly on its own expertise and skills. The three major

69. Jijin guanli gongsi teding kehu zichan guanli yewu shidian banfa [Trial
Measures for Public Fund Management Companies to Engage in Asset Management
Services for Specific Clients] (promulgated by the CSRC, Aug. 25, 2011),
LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id
=8909; Jijin gongsi teding duoge kehu zichan guanli hetong neirong yu geshi zhunze
[Guidelines on Content and Format of Contracts for Public Fund Management
Companies to Engage in Asset Management Services for Specific Clients]
(promulgated by the CSRC, Aug. 25, 2011), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub
/zjhpublic/G00306201/201109/t20110902_199420.htm.
70. See Trial Implementation Measures for Client Asset Management Business of
Securities Companies, supra note 68, art. 11; Trial Measures for Public Fund
Management Companies to Engage in Asset Management Services for Specific Clients,
supra note 69, arts. 7-8.
71. See infra Part II.B for further discussion.
72. Actually, because these funds are also organized as trusts, the Go-Goal
database covers them. The primary difference between these funds and sunshine funds
is that the latter are managed by a private, independent investment
advisory/management firm, rather than a securities brokerage firm or a public fund
management company. However, because such difference is not captured in the GoGoal database, the sample of sunshine funds used in this paper was hand-collected from
the original data in Go-Goal.com.
73. This was first allowed under Chinese law in 2002 by Xintuo touzi gongsi zijin
xintuo guanli zanxing banfa [Interim Measures for Administration of Capital Trust
Established by Trust and Investment Companies] (promulgated by the CBRC, June 13,
2002) LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com, which were
amended and replaced by Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts
Established by Trust Companies, supra note 25.
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business models of trust-organized hedge funds are discussed in more
detail in Part II.B, below.
Similarly, commercial banks can design various asset management
plans and sell them to various groups of their clients to pool funds.74 The
pooled capital will then be managed and invested as described in the
asset management plan. For those plans that target high-risk assets,
and/or those that do not guarantee any fixed returns, banks may only
pool funds from investors with previous investing experience. 75 A
common way for commercial banks to conduct such business is through
collaboration with trust companies:76 a bank entrusts the funds pooled
from its asset management plan to a trust company, which will manage
and invest the entrusted assets either on its own or by retaining thirdparty investment advisers. It must be noted that such a trust is prohibited
from investing in non-listed firms, should not be designed as an openend fund, and must have a term of at least one year.77
To be sure, a number of differences exist among the
aforementioned types of “privately offered funds” because of the nature
of the financial institutions that raise and/or manage them. For example,
the minimum capital contribution required by law to participate in a
privately offered fund pooled and managed by a securities brokerage

74. Shangye yinhang geren licai yewu guanli zanxing banfa [Temporary Rules for
Administration of Asset Management Business for Individual Clients of Commercial
Banks] (promulgated by the CBRC, Sep. 24, 2005) LAWINFOCHINA, art. 10, available
at http://www.lawinfochina.com.
75. The minimum subscription price for those asset management plans targeting
investors with previous investing experience should be RMB100,000. See Guanyu
jinyibu guifan shangye yinhang geren licai yewu touzi guanli de tongzhi [Notice on
Regulating Investments Made Under the Asset Management Business for Individual
Clients of Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the CBRC, July 6, 2009),
LAWINFOCHINA, art. 5, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com.
76. Shangye yinhang yu xintuo gongsi yewu hezuo zhiyin [Guidelines for Business
Cooperation between Commercial Banks and Trust Companies] (promulgated by the
CBRC, Dec. 4, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com.
77. See arts. 3-5, Guanyu guifan yinxin licai hezuo yewu youguan shixiang de
tongzhi [Notice on Regulating Several Issues Concerning Business Cooperation
between Commercial Banks and Trust Companies] (promulgated by the CBRC, Aug.
10, 2010), available at http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?do
cID=201008120BD60A6611EE72C2FF98E47C97F36A00.
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firm is RMB 50,000. 78 In comparison, an investor must contribute at
least RMB 1 million to participate in a fund pooled by a trust company79
or by a public fund management company. 80 However, securities
brokerage firms are not prohibited from raising their entry threshold to a
higher level such as RMB 1 million, 81 thus reducing the number of
investors in the fund. Moreover, there are certain investment restrictions
on the collective investment funds pooled and managed by established
financial institutions, like securities brokerage firms and commercial
banks, due to the need for risk management and diversification. For
instance, a securities-company-created-collective-fund is subject to the
so-called “double 10%” restrictions, namely, that the fund shall not
invest more than 10% of its assets in any single security, and shall not
hold more than 10% of the stock of any company.82 Such investment
restrictions are not required by law for trust funds, while trust companies
can surely apply them in managing their funds if they wish. Thus, the
differences among various types of “privately offered funds” become
nominal in light of their inherent similarities. Essentially, they all can
satisfy the four key characteristics of hedge funds as set forth at the
beginning of this article: they are pooled, privately organized funds
administered by professional investment managers; they are targeted at
only a limited number of investors, 83 and thus operate outside the
78. Trial Implementation Measures for Client Asset Management Business of
Securities Companies, supra note 68, art. 30.
79. Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by Trust
Companies, supra note 25, art. 6.
80. Trial Measures for Public Fund Management Companies to Engage in Asset
Management Services for Specific Clients, supra note 69, art. 9.
81. In practice, securities brokerage firms actually do ask for a higher minimum
capital contribution from the investors in the funds they pool. For example, Baoding No.
1 Collective Asset Management Plan (raised and managed by Shenyin Wanguo
Securities) asks for a minimum capital contribution of RMB 1 million, as does Zijin
Strategic Picks Collective Asset Management Plan (raised and managed by Huatai
Securities).
82. Trial Implementation Measures for Client Asset Management Business of
Securities Companies, supra note 68, art. 37.
83. To set up a collective asset management fund, a securities brokerage firm can
only pool and manage the capital from a specific group of people, i.e., its own clients,
or clients from its promotion agencies. See Detailed Rules for Implementation of
Collective Asset Management Business of Securities Companies (for Trial
Implementation), supra note 68, art. 6. As for collective asset management funds
created by public fund management firms, there cannot be more than 200 investors in a
single fund. See Trial Measures for Public Fund Management Companies to Engage in
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onerous securities regulation and disclosure requirements84 applicable to
public offered funds.85
This article only focuses on one particular type of hedge fund in
China, the sunshine fund, because among all of the types mentioned
above, only sunshine funds are initiated and managed by private,
independent investment management firms whose sole or primary
business is to run collective securities investment funds. Trust
companies have been involved because private fund managers could not
otherwise legally raise hedge funds from investors in China before the
LP form was officially allowed, and thus they needed a platform to
legalize this process. This offers an explanation of the origin of the
name “sunshine funds,” as hedge funds in China, which are otherwise
illegitimate, are put under sunshine because of the possibility that a trust
form can be utilized.
As already mentioned in the introduction, the first LP-organized
private securities investment fund in China was created in March 2010.
Although it is immediately obvious that the LP form grants investors
pass-through taxation benefits, its significance to China’s alternative
asset management industry goes far beyond that. In simple words, the
LP form provides a legally recognized vehicle that delivers the much

Asset Management Services for Specific Clients, supra note 69, art. 11. A collective
capital trust established by a trust company cannot have more than 50 natural person
investors, but there is no limit for institutional investors. See Administrative Measures
for Collective Capital Trusts Established by Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 5.
84. Note that, this is so only to a relative extent, i.e., when compared to publicly
offered funds. The aforementioned collective funds do not totally escape regulation
capture. For example, collective asset management funds established by securities
brokerage firms need to be registered with the CSRC (prior registration). See Trial
Implementation Measures for Client Asset Management Business of Securities
Companies, supra note 68, art. 21. Collective asset management funds established by
public asset management firms also need to be registered with the CSRC (postregistration). See Trial Measures for Public Fund Management Companies to Engage in
Asset Management Services for Specific Clients, supra note 69, art. 18. Collective
securities investment trust funds established by trust companies need to be filed with
the CBRC (post registration). See Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities
Investment Trusts by Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 11. Comparatively, setting
up a publicly offered fund needs prior approval from the CSRC, and the disclosure
obligation is much broader and more onerous.
85. See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 1.
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needed contractual flexibility to contain the compensation, distribution
and exit mechanisms necessary to incentivize talented fund managers to
work hard for their investors. Comparatively, such high level of
contractual flexibility is not directly and fully offered by normal closed
companies. Although the LP form was made available in June 2007,
when China’s amended Partnership Enterprise Law took effect, 86
Chinese hedge funds industry only began to use this business form in
2010 because Chinese law did not allow partnerships to open securities
accounts until the end of 2009.87 Before that, even if a Chinese hedge
fund was willing to adopt the LP form, it could still not do business
without a securities account. In comparison, because private equity
funds only invest in non-listed companies and do not need such accounts,
China’s PE industry enthusiastically welcomed the LP form and started
to reap its benefits by using it to set up new funds immediately after its
birth, 88 despite the fact that PE funds could also be organized as
companies89 or as trusts,90 similar to sunshine funds.
Theoretically, the emergence of the LP form in China is
undoubtedly good news for private, independent fund managers, in that
86.
87.

See Partnership Enterprise Law, supra note 19.
See Zhengquan dengji jiesuan guanli banfa [Measures for Administration of
Securities Registration and Clearing] (promulgated by the CSRC, Apr. 7, 2006)
(amended Nov. 20, 2009), art. 19, available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/
G00306201/200911/t20091127_173555.htm.
88. The first limited partnership VC fund in China was Cowin Capital, which was
set up on June 26, 2007 in Shenzhen. Cowin was reported to have already successfully
exited from two of its investments in 2009. See Jiang Fei, Quanguo shoujia youxian
hehuozhi chuangtou jijin quxian tuichu [China’s First Limited Partnership VC
Managed Exits Despite Detour], DIYI CAIJING RIBAO [FIRST FINANCIAL DAILY], Mar.
17, 2009, available at http://finance.ifeng.com/money/fund/jjdt/20090317/450613.
shtml.
89. Chuangye touzi qiye zanxing guanli banfa [Interim Measures for the
Administration of Startup Investment Enterprises] (jointly promulgated by National
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry
of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Bank of China, State Administration of
Taxation, State Administration of Industry and Commerce, the CBRC, the CSRC, and
State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Nov. 15, 2005), LAWINFOCHINA, art. 6,
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com.
90. Xintuo gongsi siren guquan touzi xintuo yewu caozuo zhiyin [Guidelines for
Trust Companies to Operate the Trust Private Equity Investment Business]
(promulgated by the CBRC, June 25, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA, available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com. Other than trusts, private equity funds in China can also
take two other forms, namely, a company and limited partnership.
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they can now set up on their own a private equity or hedge fund as a
limited partnership without having to resort to the trust platform offered
by trust companies. In practice, however, it is far too early to predict that
the Chinese hedge fund industry will soon shift toward this new
business form. The governance structure of the very first LP-organized
private securities investment fund, named Yinhe Purun and managed by
a firm called Yinhe Fortune (Beijing) Asset Management Co., Ltd.
(“Yinhe Fortune”),91 is still substantially different from what is prevalent
in the U.S. hedge fund business. According to an anecdotal report, the
partnership was formed by no more than 49 limited partners,92 each of
whom had to contribute at least RMB 300,000. Rather than a mere
nominal portion of total capital contribution, general partners were
responsible for financing as much as half of the partnership interests.93
Given the reported fund size of approximately RMB 300 million at its
inception, general partners should have contributed RMB 150 million
into the fund.94 As reported, such a large amount was paid not only by
Yinhe Fortune, but also by institutions with deeper pockets and acting as
additional general partners.95 The fund has a term of only one year and
expects a fixed target return of around 7-8% for limited partners.96 It
will be forced into termination if its unit net asset value (“NAV”) is
lower than 70% of the original purchase price of its partnership units.97
Except for the fact that a partnership is used as its business form, such a
set of contractual arrangements is distinct in almost every way from that
of a U.S. hedge fund. The typical 2-20 compensation mechanism was
abandoned because the game here is no longer about betting on a fund
manager’s personal superior skills. This is understandable considering
that the fund is the very first one raised in China using a LP as the
business form, and the fund manager does not have an established
record for raising and managing other hedge funds, nor a very deep
91. See Yinhe Fortune’s official website, available at http://www.yhzc.com.cn
/html/.
92. See Zhao & Hu, supra note 18. In China, a limited partnership can have no
more than 50 partners. Partnership Enterprise Law, supra note 19, art. 61.
93. See Zhao & Hu, supra note 18.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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pocket.98 As an asset management firm with almost zero accumulated
reputational capital and willing to set up its first and also China’s first
LP-type hedge fund, it might be necessary for Yinhe Fortune to take out
substantial capital contributions and secure fixed returns for limited
partners in order to sufficiently impress them and make the fundraising
easier to accomplish. It thus remains to be seen what kind of contractual
arrangements will be used in subsequent LP funds, especially for those
with more established managers.
A. HEDGE FUNDS ORGANIZED AS TRUSTS: STRUCTURE
AND BUSINESS MODELS
As shown in Figure 4, below, although taking the form of a trust, a
typical Chinese hedge fund trust engages a similar group of primary
service providers as those included in Figure 3. Because besides the
investors, there are four parties (trust company, investment adviser,
securities company and custodian bank) that are also involved in setting
up and running a trust-organized hedge fund in China, such structure is
also often called “four party cooperation” model. The major notable
difference between the two figures rests with the multi-identities of the
investment adviser, and its interaction with the trust company resulting
therefrom. Such interaction can be classified into three models in which
hedge fund trusts can choose to operate their business. Interestingly, the
three models are named after the place where they were invented and
primarily implemented, namely, the Yunnan model, the Shenzhen model,
and the Shanghai model.

98. Yinhe Fortune was incorporated in 2008 and has a registered capital of RMB
10 million. See http://www.yhzc.com.cn/html/index.asp. Both Yinhe Fortune and its
key managers were considered “not well known” within China’s asset management
business until the establishment of Yinhe Purun. See Zhao & Hu, supra note 18.
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Figure 4
Typical Structure for a Chinese Hedge Fund Organized as a Trust
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In the Yunnan model, the trust company does not engage a thirdparty investment adviser, but rather uses its own professional team and
acts as the de facto manager and adviser to operate the fund.99 The most
pronounced example of this model is a series of funds called “China
Dragon,” which were created and are managed by Yunnan Trust
Corporation.100 At present, there are altogether 22 trust funds under the
name of China Dragon,101 the first of which was established in August
2003, 102 even earlier than the first sunshine fund that was created in
99. See Zhu Xiaomin & Ding Ding, 216%! Yunguotou zaichuang shenhua [216%!
Another Legend of Yunnan Trust Corporation], HEXUN, Mar. 12, 2008, available at
http://funds.hexun.com/2008-03-12/104392658.html.
100. Id; see also http://www.chinadragonfunds.com/team.aspx. All four major fund
managers for the China Dragon series are from Yunnan Trust.
101. See http://www.chinadragonfunds.com/product.aspx.
102. The first China Dragon fund, also the very first hedge fund trust in China, was
called “China Dragon Capital Market Collective Money Trust Plan,” and was set up by
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2004.103 It is worth noting that although Yunnan is an inner province
located in the southwest of China, China Dragon’s performance is
recognized even when compared to the highest-profile sunshine funds
located Shanghai and Shenzhen.104 Note that because the manager of the
Yunnan model fund is the trust company itself, it is not classified, based
on the definitions in this article, as a sunshine fund, which only refers to
those funds managed by private investment advisory/management firms.
The Shenzhen model is at present the most prevalent business
model employed by sunshine funds. The reason it is so named is that the
two most representative trust companies promoting such a model are
Shenzhen International Trust and Investment Corporation (“SZITIC”),
and Ping An Trust Co., Ltd. (“Ping An”), which are both headquartered
in Shenzhen.105 As mentioned in the introduction, the very first sunshine
fund in China was created in Shenzhen by SZITIC. 106 The most
distinctive feature of the Shenzhen model is that the trust company
retains a third-party investment adviser to act as the de facto manager of
the fund. The adviser will be responsible for establishing the investment
strategy and creating a desirable portfolio to invest in, while the trust
company only carries out the investment order from the adviser upon
formally checking it. Thus, the trust company only serves as an asset
management platform and a financial service provider.107 Compensation
to the investment adviser consists of two parts: a fixed fee based on total
assets managed, plus a performance-based flexible fee referred to as
Yunnan Trust on Aug. 1, 2003. See China Dragon Milestones,
http://www.chinadragonfunds.com/Resume.aspx?Page=8.
103. See Zhang, supra note 23.
104. For example, the 2007 annual return of China Dragon Capital Market
Collective Money Trust Plan was 216.44%, ranking No. 2 among all publicly and
privately offered funds in China during that year. See Zhu & Ding, supra note 99.
105. See Shen Xing, Shenzhen niangzao simu fuhuaqi: Shenguotou moshi fengsheng
shuiqi [Shenzhen Creates Incubator for Privately-Offered Funds: SZITIC Model
Thrives], JINGJI GUANCHA BAO [THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER], Apr. 1, 2007, available at
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/y/20070401/10473461412.shtml.
106. See Zhang, supra note 23.
107. Though a controversial issue, this was confirmed by Mr. Lu Qiang, SZITIC’s
Vice General Manager during a recent interview with him. See Zhang Xiaozhou,
Yangguang simu yewu jintui zhidao [Future Strategies of Sunshine Funds’ Business],
ERSHIYI SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21ST CENTURY BUSINESS HERALD], June 11, 2010,
available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/fund/20100610/23358099889.shtml. For
more detailed discussions of the roles of the trust company and investment adviser. See
infra Part III, where empirical data are analyzed.
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“special trust interests,” in the contracts, as distinguished from the
“ordinary trust interests” – i.e. the returns enjoyed by the fund’s
investors upon the trust units they hold.108
The Shanghai model, represented by those funds created by Huabao
Trust Co., Ltd. (“Huabao”) and Shanghai International Trust and
Investment Corporation (“SITICO”), is a third business model employed
by sunshine funds. Unlike the Shenzhen model, where all investors bear
the same level of risk, investors in the Shanghai model funds are
classified into a preferred class and a subordinated class (may also be
called “ordinary class”).109 Subordinated investors are almost always the
investment advisers of the fund (and/or its related or designated
parties). 110 Subordinated investors are required to contribute a
significant portion of the total capital in a fund. 111 Preferred
investors/beneficiaries will enjoy a pre-determined fixed rate of return,
usually 5% – 10%, which may be topped with some extra flexible
108. The two terms used here (i.e., special trust interests and ordinary trust interests)
are direct translation of the corresponding Chinese (i.e., teshu xintuo liyi and yiban
xintuo liyi, respectively). They are used as the standard terms in the trust contracts of
sunshine funds.
109. See Zhongguo yinhangye jiandu guanli weiyuanhui guanyu jiaqiang xintuo
gongsi jiegouhua xintuo yewu jianguan youguan wenti de tongzhi [Notice of China
Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the Supervision of the Structured
Trust Business of Trust Companies], (promulgated by the CBRC, Feb. 5, 2010),
LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com, art. 1.
110. See Kong Peng, Shichanghua xintuo chanpin yeji gengjia [Market-Oriented
Trust Products Show Better Performance], XIN CAIFU [NEW FORTUNE], Oct. 17, 2008,
available at http://www.p5w.net/newfortune/qianyan/200810/t1952084.htm. It is worth
noting that trust companies are explicitly prohibited from acting as the subordinated
class investors. See Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening
the Supervision of the Structured Trust Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109,
art. 7.
111. See Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the
Supervision of the Structured Trust Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, art. 6
(requiring that “the proportion of investment from subordinated class investors should
not be set too low”). In practice, subordinated investors can contribute between 40% 60% of the total capital. See Wang Chao, Qianxi zhengquan touzixing jiegouhua xintuo
simu chanpin de shouyi fencheng moshi jiqi fengxian kongzhi [A Brief Analysis of the
Return Distribution and Risk Control of Structured Securities Investment Trust Funds],
8 ZHONGGUO SHANGJIE [BUSINESS CHINA] 3, 3 (2008), available at http://wenku.baid
u.com/view/8d32bf3b87c24028915fc3bc.html.
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returns payable if the NAV as of termination is greater than a certain
pre-determined threshold. 112 Once preferred investors are satisfied,
subordinated investors share what remains.113 If the fund loses money, it
is only the investments from the subordinated investors/beneficiaries
that will suffer from the loss, so as to make sure that the preferred
investors/beneficiaries are still able to get the promised fixed return. To
that end, subordinated investors/beneficiaries bear the obligation to
contribute new capital into the fund, which is usually triggered by the
NAV thereof falling under a certain precaution threshold.114 Since the
Shanghai model funds have two classes of investors/beneficiaries, which
are very different from each other in terms of risk and returns, they are
also more often referred to as “structured funds,”115 whereas Shenzhen
model funds are more often referred to as “unstructured funds.” 116
Looking back again at the contractual arrangements of Yinhe Purun, one
may have the feeling that the fund actually operates much like a
structured trust under the Shanghai model – the distinction between
general and limited partners reflects the structural difference between
preferred and subordinated investors.

112. See Wang, supra note 111; see also Zhang Yue, Woguo xintuo xing simu jijin
sanzhong moshi de bijiao fenxi [A Comparative Analysis of the Three Models of
Organizing Privately-Offered Trust Funds in China], 23 XIANDAI SHANGYE [MODERN
BUSINESS] 8, 8 (2010), available at http://www.cqvip.com/Read/Read.aspx?id=3494
9103 for its published form [hereinafter Zhang, A Comparative Analysis].
113. See Zhang, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 112.
114. See Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the
Supervision of the Structured Trust Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, art. 6.
To give examples from the sample of contracts I collected, in the contract of a
structured fund named “SITICO Sapphire – Hengda Tonghui,” subordinated class
investors need to put money into the fund as soon as the unit NAV falls under 95% of
the starting value. The trigger for another structured fund, namely, “SZITIC He Ying
Structured,” is 90%.
115. For a complete definition of “structured trust business,” see Notice of China
Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the Supervision of the Structured
Trust Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, art. 1; see also Kong, supra note
110.
116. See Qin Liping, Shenzhen moshi vs. Shanghai moshi: Yangguang simu liang
panghuang [Shenzhen Model vs. Shanghai Model: Sunshine Funds’ Dilemma], DIYI
CAIJING RIBAO [CHINA BUSINESS NEWS], July 4, 2009, available at
http://money.163.com/09/0704/03/5DBMCO1Q00253B0H.html.
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TRUST CONTRACTS OF SUNSHINE
FUNDS
A. SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION

The sample used in this article consists of hand-collected contracts
and explanations of the trust plans of 139 sunshine fund trusts. Data
collection began with Go-Goal’s Investment Trusts Database.117 Within
this database, one can find basic information about the name, inception
date, trust term, trust company, prime broker, custodian, investment
adviser, and manager(s) of a trust fund, as well as more advanced
information of these items, such as the registered place of business of
the investment adviser, curriculum vitae of the fund managers, fees,
targeted return (for structured funds), and even the volatility and Sharpe
ratio of the fund. 118 Such more advanced information may not be
updated or complete for every fund and thus may require
supplementation through further research. Go-Goal also provides real
time data on the latest unit net asset value and annualized return of the
current year for all of the funds in the database, as long as they are
available. 119 As of August 9, 2010, there were 1,230 private-offered
securities investment funds organized as trusts on file in Go-Goal’s
investment trusts database.
To be sure, Go-Goal is not the only provider of data on Chinese
private securities investment trust funds. There are also some other
websites, such as www.simuwang.com and www.asimu.com. Compared
to Go-Goal, the databases provided by these websites are generally less
comprehensive and complete, particularly with respect to the non-basic,
advanced information. That said, the most important reason that this
study utilized Go-Goal over these other websites is that Go-Goal also
collects information for those funds that are already terminated,120 while

117.
118.
119.
120.

See http://www.go-goal.com/inv_trust/basic/.
See http://www.go-goal.com/inv_trust/Achievement/.
See http://www.go-goal.com/inv_trust/basic/.
Go-Goal database offers four basic filters: structured funds, unstructured funds,
terminated funds, and existing funds. One can tick one or more of them to set the
desired search.
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such is not directly available from the other two websites.121 Including
terminated funds expands the time range of my sample, thus permitting
the consideration of certain changes that happened during different
times and the extrapolation of interesting conclusions therefrom.
However, the major disadvantage of Go-Goal is that it lacks effective
filters to distinguish sunshine funds from those trust funds managed by
established financial institutions, like trust companies, securities
brokerage firms, and public fund management companies. As a result,
one must manually count the sunshine funds to determine their number
and detailed breakdown thereof.
The total number of sunshine funds with clearly indentified
investment adviser(s) in Go-Goal’s database from February 20, 2004 to
August 9, 2010 is 838. The 838 funds cover privately-offered securities
investment funds organized as trusts and managed by private investment
advisory/management firms. As said before, this number excludes the
trust funds managed solely by trust companies, securities brokerage
firms, public fund management companies, commercial banks, or
subsidiaries thereof, and (to the extent I am aware of) those funds
pooled by banks and entrusted to trust companies via the “commercial
bank – trust company cooperation” business model. This number
includes those funds where both private investment adviser firms and
established financial institutions (or subsidiaries thereof) are involved in
co-management, and those funds managed by private investment
advisers that are (whether separate or not) subsidiaries of industrial
institutions and PE/VC firms but not established financial institutions.
Several legal documents are required to set up a hedge fund trust.
Beyond those entered into between the trust company and various
service providers of the fund, the law requires a trust company to
execute at least the following three documents with its fund investors: (a)
the trust contract; (b) explanations of trust plan; and (c) the risk
statement for investors subscribing into the fund.122 I went through the
121. The database offered by Simuwang.com does not allow users to directly search
for terminated funds. As such, it is not a very good choice to begin my research with, as
I would not be able to know whether the database covers both existing and terminated
funds (which would be ideal), without first knowing which ones are already terminated.
With respect to Asimu.com, it offers a ranking system for existing funds based on their
NAV and annual performance, and users can choose funds they wish to invest in by
reading the rank.
122. See Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by Trust
Companies, supra note 25, arts. 10 and 15.
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list of 838 funds one by one and attempted to obtain the trust contract
and/or explanations of trust plan for each fund. Since there is no legal
requirement to disclose these contracts/explanations, they are not public
unless the relevant parties to a trust fund voluntarily disclose them for
various reasons. The contracts I was able to obtain primarily come from
websites of investment advisers and trust companies, and certain online
document collection websites (similar to www.onecle.com) that allow
free online reading but charge a download fee. These websites are
particularly valuable in terms of collecting those old contracts dated
from 2004 to 2007.
In deciding whether to include a certain document in the sample, I
focused on whether it expresses the major important terms of the trust
fund, rather than whether it is literally named “trust contract.” There are
a number of funds, for example some from Ping An, whose contracts are
merely standard documents with general terms, while all the dealspecific terms and conditions are actually contained in the explanations
of trust plans that are ancillary agreements to the trust contracts.
Furthermore, the fact that the sample contains trust documents for 139
funds does not mean that every one of these documents contains all
important contractual terms. This is particularly true for those
explanations of trust plans, some of which do not provide, e.g., fee
information or covenants. Nevertheless, they are included because they
contain information useful in other respects, and the study uses smaller
samples within the 139 funds when discussing certain contractual terms.
Finally, it is necessary to point out that the contracts in my sample are
unexecuted documents. This makes sense because, while it might be
smart to publish unexecuted sample documents absent mandatory
disclosure requirements so that potential clients may access them and
consider investing, it is unwise to disclose confidential information,
such as the identities of investors, to people not affiliated with the fund.
As such, I cannot fully exclude the possibility that sample documents
may have been amended when they are executed, especially when such
amendments are demanded by those investors contributing a large
amount of capital.
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B. SAMPLE COVERAGE
Table 1
Comparison of Go-Goal Database with My Sample*
My Sample

Go-Goal

Coverage

139

838

16.6%

Terminated

7

135

5.2%

In operation

132

703

18.8%

17

263

6.5%

122

575

21.2%

2

Not known**

Not known**

Total Number of Sunshine Funds

Structured (Shanghai Model)
Unstructured (Shenzhen Model)
Fund of funds (including trust of trusts)
Number of Trust Companies

20

40

50.0%

Number of Investment Advisers***

74

347

21.3%

* All numbers referring to funds are for sunshine funds.
** These numbers are not known for the whole Go-Goal database, as the information in such
respects can only be obtained if the trust contracts/explanations of trust plans of these funds can be
obtained.
*** Among the 74 investment advisers, four are corporate investment arms belonging to industrial
parent companies, four also run overseas hedge funds in addition to onshore sunshine funds, and
three advisers are organized as limited partnerships.

As shown in Table 1, above, the sample includes approximately
16.6% of the sunshine funds in Go-Goal’s database. In particular, the
coverage for funds in operation is 18.8%, and for unstructured
(Shenzhen model) funds is 21.2%. The coverage of my sample is
particularly low with respect to terminated funds, as well as structured
(Shanghai model) funds. It is reasonable that contracts for terminated
funds are harder to find, because there is no reason that investment
advisers/trust companies should still keep them online after
termination. 123 In fact, all of the legal documents for the seven
terminated funds were found through several online document collection
websites instead of the official websites of trust companies and
investment adviser firms. Structured funds are easier to raise because

123. A trust company or an investment adviser may want to upload to its website a
sample of a sunshine fund trust contract, with the hope that a potential investor may
want to invest in the fund upon opening the webpage and reading the contract.
However, it will not make much sense to keep the contract online once the fund is
already terminated. As such, it is much more difficult to find trust contracts for
terminated funds than for funds in operation.
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they generally are of a short term (normally one to two years)124 and
secure a fixed target return to investors; 125 therefore, the need to
publicize the legal documents to attract potential investors might not be
as high as compared with unstructured funds.
One may question the potential selection bias of my sample, even
though it is collected from publically available data to the most extent
possible. One may criticize that my sample has included
disproportionally more funds initiated and managed by those lessexperienced investment advisers with potentially thin client bases. Such
investment advisers may be located outside those big and/or rich cities,
or young in terms of inception year, and thus are particularly keen on
publicizing their fund documents to enhance their reputation to better
compete with the well-located or more-experienced investment advisers
and even attract investors from such advisers. This is indeed a valid
point; yet a comparison of my sample with Go-Goal in terms of the
location of investment advisers does not seem to lend much support to
such criticism. As shown in Figure 5, below, the overwhelming majority
of investment advisers captured in my sample also come from big, rich
municipalities and coastal areas, while only some 5% of them are from
inner provinces, which are generally considered as comparatively less
developed. With respect to investment advisers’ inception years, my
sample also shows wide coverage from 2000 to 2009. Figure 6, below,
shows the distribution of the inception years of the investment advisers
included in my sample (based on a sample of 68 out of 74 advisers).
Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 7 (fund inception years), below, both
charts demonstrate a spike from 2006 to 2007, meaning that the bulk of
funds started to come into existence in that year. As such, it is
reasonable that advisers formed in recent years are more often covered
in my sample, given that hedge funds are an emerging business in China.

124. For the 17 structured funds in my sample, four funds have a term of five years,
one fund has a term of three years, two funds have a term of two years, five funds have
a term of 1.5 years, and also five funds have a term of one year.
125. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Figure 5
Comparison of Go-Goal Database with my Sample in Terms of
Adviser Location
Location of Investment Advisers
Go-Goal
39.8%
27.0%
19.3%
16.2%

Beijing

My Sample
43.2%

22.5%
13.0%
8.1%

Shanghai

Shenzhen

South-Eastern
Coast Areas

Figure 6
Investment Advisers’ Year of Inception

5.5% 5.4%
Inner Land
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C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
An interesting point arises if one looks at Figure 7 together with
Table 1. As shown in Table 1, my sample only covers two funds of
sunshine funds. Since I collected my data from public resources, it is
difficult to control the types of funds when the data depends on
availability. However, the actual number of funds of sunshine funds
should be much bigger because in July 2009, China Securities
Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited, the holder and manager
of all securities brokerage accounts in China, suspended the approval of
all new account opening applications by trust companies for securities
investment trusts, based on the “concerns that the imprudent behavior of
some trust companies may harm the reform of the system for new shares
offering.” 126 Presently, this suspension is still in place. 127 Since a

126. See Guanyun xintuo gongsi xintuo chanpin zhuanyong zhengquan zhanghu
youguan shixiang fengxian tishi de tongzhi [Notice on the Risks Related to Certain
Issues of Securities Accounts for the Trust Products of Trust Companies] (promulgated
by the CBRC, Aug. 18, 2009), available at http://www.yanglee.com/flfg/2010/4/1
9/13524.html. To be more precise, because every trust product can open a securities
account, and a trust company can have many trust products under its name, some trust
companies are abusing this by opening a lot of securities accounts to participate in IPO
allotments. This is done to enhance the success rate of subscribing for new shares. See
Ma Yufeng et al., Zhengjianhui yaoqiu xintuo zanting kaihu: fangfan duokai zhanghu
daxin [CSRC Suspends New Account Opening by Trusts: To Guard Against
Participating in IPO Allotments with Multi-Accounts], MEIRI JINGJI XINWEN [NATIONAL
BUSINESS DAILY], July 14, 2009, http://bank.jrj.com.cn/2009/07/1407055498665.shtml.
127. The suspension of opening securities accounts for trust funds came out of “an
oral notice from the CSRC to China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation
Limited” in July 2009; however, more than a year later, there is now no indication of
when it will resume. See Liu Zhaoqiong & Zhao Juan, Simu de “diren” [“Enemies” of
Sunshine Funds], JINGJI GUANCHA BAO [THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER], Nov 1, 2010,
available at http://www.eeo.com.cn/finance/funds/2010/10/31/184399.shtml. There
have been rumors that the suspension would be lifted upon checking and cleaning up
the current securities investment trust accounts, as well as upon the promulgation of a
new regulation by the CBRC targeted at the issue of trust companies opening securities
accounts. This new regulation would prohibit trust companies from splitting one fund
for the purposes of opening multiple accounts and from re-using accounts left by
liquidated funds for new funds. See Cheng Zhiyun & Zhao Juan, Zhengquan touzi
xintuo chongqi kaihu; yangguang simu canzao wushang [Opening of Securities
Investment Trust Accounts May Be Soon Resumed; Sunshine Funds However Remain
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sunshine fund can only run its business with a securities account, it is
reasonable to predict that, given such suspension, the number of funds
established during the past year should be significantly reduced.
However, this is not supported by empirical data, whereas according to
the statistics of Simuwang.com, a total of 481 sunshine funds were
created for the whole year of 2010, exceeding the number of funds
created in 2009. This poses an interesting question - how did these new
funds come into being despite the regulatory obstacle?
According to anecdotal reports, newly created sunshine funds in the
year of 2010 either managed to buy and use those old accounts
previously opened by trust companies hoping that they would be lucky
enough to not be detected by regulatory authorities,128 or, more cleverly,
started to organize as trusts of trusts (“ToT”, or trust of funds, “ToF”),
investing in other securities investment trust funds. Organizing as a ToT
does not require a securities brokerage account, as the trust units of
other trust funds are not publicly listed securities. 129 SZITIC was the
first trust company to start the ToT business. 130 According to the
database provided by Simuwang.com, 16 sunshine funds were set up as

Hurt], JINGJI GUANCHA BAO [THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER], Sept. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.eeo.com.cn/finance/banking/2009/09/13/151234.shtml.
128. See Zhang Huiyu, Yangguang simu xintuo zhanghu qiyue gaoji: mailuqian qibu
150 wan [Shortage of Sunshine Fund Trusts (Securities) Accounts in July: At Least 1.5
Million to Buy One], LICAI ZHOUBAO [MONEY WEEK], July 4, 2011,
http://finance.ifeng.com/fund/smjj/20110704/4221735.shtml. There runs a regulatory
risk for investment advisers to buy old securities accounts from trust companies, in that
trust companies must cancel and clean up the opened but un-used accounts, and are, in
fact, prohibited from re-using the liquidated but not yet canceled accounts. See Notice
on the Risks Related to Certain Issues of Securities Accounts for the Trust Products of
Trust Companies, supra note 126.
129. Huang Ting, Simu ToT chanpin shichang chuju chuxing: xinxi pilu butouming
cheng yinhuan [ToTs Emerging as a Scaled Business: Lack of Disclosure Could Be a
Possible Concern], DIYI CAIJING RIBAO [FIRST FINANCIAL DAILY], July 17, 2009,
http://news.hexun.com/2010-07-17/124279881.html.
130. Note that, although SZITIC was the first trust company to start a ToT business
within the sense of sunshine funds, the idea was created and implemented earlier by
Donghai Securities, a securities brokerage firm, in its collective asset management
business. See Dong Xing, Huarun xintuo jijiang tuichu zhongguo shouzhi “tuofubao”
ToF [SZITIC to Launch the Very First ToF], HEXUN, Sept. 15, 2009,
http://funds.hexun.com/2009-09-16/121112374.html.
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ToTs for the entire year 2010. 131 Alternatively, some newly incepted
sunshine funds are identified as having a “double layer” structure: they
first use a trust platform to raise capital from investors, and then the trust
will invest as a limited partner in a limited partnership, which is created
and managed by a sunshine fund management company as the general
partner thereof. It is the limited partnership that will be directly engaged
in the securities investment business. Because limited partnerships are
now able to open securities accounts, such trust-in-LP structure then
solves the account opening suspension problem which would trouble the
traditional trust-based sunshine funds. Moreover, since a trust can
contain a larger number of investors (maximum 50 natural persons, no
limitation for institutions) 132 than a limited partnership (maximum 49
investors),133 having a trust as a limited partner can also help to broaden
the investor base of a classic LP-based fund.134 Apparently, ToTs and
trust-in-LPs are notable new trends of development for Chinese hedge
funds, and it would be interesting to observe their sustainability in China
relative to the classic LP-organized funds in future research.

131. This number would increase to 36, if including those private securities
investment trust funds managed by established financial institutions, such as trust
companies and securities brokerage firms, etc.
132. See Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by Trust
Companies, supra note 25, art. 5.
133. Ye Defeng, Yangguang simu nengfou jiedao “xintuo hehuo zhi” baituo faxing
kunju? [Can sunshine funds get over the new fund creation difficulty by making use of
the trust-in-LP structure?], YICAI, Mar. 18, 2011, http://www.yicai.com/news/2011/
03/710888.html.
134. Id.
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Sunshine Fund Inception Years

* For the year 2010, data ended as of August 9, 2010.
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Table 2
Distribution of Trust Companies in my Sample
City (Province) / Location

Number of Trust Companies

Number of Funds

Beijing

4

13

Shanghai

2

3

Shenzhen

2

53

Chongqing / Southwest

1

2

Guangdong Province / Southeast

1

3

Fujian Province / Southeast

1

5

Heilongjiang Province / Northeast

1

8

Henan Province / Middle

1

1

Inner Mongolia / North

1

1

Shandong Province / Northeast

1

9

Shaanxi Province / Northwest

3

35

Sichuan Province / Southwest

1

2

Zhejiang Province / East

1

4

20

139

Total
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Table 3
Trust Companies in Terms of Number of Funds Created (As of
August 9, 2010)
Number
of Funds
in My
Sample
45

Number of
Funds in
Go-Goal

ZRITC
(Heilongjiang)

Percentage of
Structured
Funds

168

Number of
Structured
Funds in GoGoal
19

11.3%

Number of
Terminated
Funds in GoGoal
18

7

128

12

9.4%

37

CITIC (Beijing)

9

118

38

32.2%

1

SITICO
(Shanghai)

1

101

97

96.0%

75

SITIC
(Shandong)

9

85

47

55.3%

14

FOTIC (Beijing)

2

84

42

50.0%

16

Ping An
(Shenzhen)

9

79

2

2.5%

4

Huabao
(Shanghai)

2

51

38

74.5%

20

32

39

9

23.1%

1

XMITC (Fujian)

5

31

3

9.7%

2

CCITIC (Beijing)

1

31

18

58.1%

22

XITIC (Shaanxi)

1

25

16

64.0%

6

CRTrust
(Sichuan)

2

15

6

40.0%

7

BJITIC (Beijing)

1

18

1

5.6%

0

Guangdong
Finance Trust
(Guangdong)

3

11

1

9.1%

1

Western Trust
(Shaanxi)

2

9

2

22.2%

1

New Times Trust
(Inner Mongolia)

1

8

3

37.5%

4

ZTTrust
(Zhejiang)

4

7

0

0.0%

3

CQITIC
(Chongqing)

2

7

1

14.3%

3

BRITC (Henan)

1

3

2

66.7%

0

SZITIC
(Shenzhen)

SITI (Shaanxi)
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Looking at Table 2 and Table 3 together may generate some
interesting findings. First, it can be easily identified from Table 3 that
there are obvious concentrations of unstructured funds in Shenzhen
(SZITIC and Ping An) and structured funds in Shanghai (SITICO and
Huabao), respectively, despite the fact that all trust companies maintain
a mixture of both business models to different extents.135 Only 11.3% of
SZITIC’s funds and 2.5% of Ping An’s funds are structured, while 4%
of SITICO’s funds and 25.5% of Huabao’s funds are unstructured. The
underrepresentation of structured funds in the sample is most
pronounced for SITICO, where only one out of its 101 funds is covered
in the sample. Again, this is not surprising, given that the legal
documents for structured funds are harder to find due to the reasons
discussed above, especially when the funds are already terminated.
Second, the funds located in Shenzhen and Shaanxi Province are
highly concentrated. Out of the 54 funds from Shenzhen, 45 are
contributed by SZITIC, and out of the 35 funds from Shaanxi Province,
32 are contributed by Shaanxi International Trust and Investment
Corporation (“SITI”). The concentration found in the Shenzhen market
is relatively straightforward, as SZITIC was the inventor and very first
implementer of trust-organized hedge funds in China and has been
known as the “base of the Shenzhen business model” ever since. As a
matter of fact, SZITIC is the undisputed leader in China’s hedge funds
industry because it has the largest number of sunshine trust funds under
its name. Although smaller than Shanghai and Beijing in geographical
and population size, Shenzhen is fourth largest economy among all of
China’s big and medium sized cities, with a GDP that is comparable to a
middle-sized Chinese province.136 Shenzhen is also known for its spirit

135. ZTTrust (Zhejiang Province) is exceptional. All of its seven funds were created
in October and November 2007, and it does not have any other sunshine funds
according to Go-Goal’s record. As such, the fact that it does not have any structured
funds under its name is more likely due to the fact that the trust company does not
actively engage in the sunshine funds business any longer after 2007, rather than an
intentional focus on promoting unstructured funds.
136. See Information Office of Shenzhen People’s Government, Shenzhen
Overview, SZ.GOV.CN, http://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/zjsz/szgl/201107/t20110712_167568
7.htm (briefly summarizing the comprehensive competitiveness of Shenzhen’s
economy).
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of innovation, 137 especially for economic and financial development.
Therefore, it is not surprising that it has managed to develop a cluster of
hedge funds, which is also well represented in my sample. SITI’s
dominance is also relatively straightforward. My sample contains 32 of
all 39 funds created by SITI, representing a very high rate of coverage.
SITI funds have such a high rate of coverage because SITI is the only
listed trust company among all trust companies that engages in the
business of creating and managing securities investment trust funds. As
a public company, SITI discloses a set of legal documents of the trusts it
created on its website, where I accessed the explanations of trust plans
for the 32 funds.
A very important reason for Chinese hedge funds to base
themselves upon trusts is that trust companies, which are almost always
state-owned financial institution and enjoy established reputations, can
advertise and sell hedge funds trust units to investors 138 much more
easily and effectively than private investment advisory firms. That said,
a trust company can only advertise and sell trust products within the
province where it is registered, and must report and file with the local
China Banking Regulatory Commission (“CBRC”) if it wants to
advertise and sell trust products in other provinces. 139 Therefore,
investment advisers prefer to set up hedge funds with those trust
companies located in richer and more developed provinces, since the
likelihood of quickly attracting high-quality investors is higher in these
places. It is thus interesting to find that, compared with the location
distribution of investment advisers, as shown in Figure 6, above, trust
companies do not appear to exhibit a similar level of heavy
concentration in developed and rich areas as investment adviser firms.
137. Shenzhen was No. 1 on Forbes’s 2010 Rank of Most Innovative Cities in
China. See http://www.forbeschina.com/list/776.
138. A trust company can surely advertise the trust plans created under its name,
provided that it does not do so by directing its advertisement toward the general public
or through public means. For example, it can place introductory brochures at its place
of business, but advertising through public media such as newspapers, radio, or
television is not allowed. See Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts
Established by Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 8. However, it can be difficult in
practice to decide if a particular behavior should be allowed or not, e.g., sending group
messages to potential clients.
139. Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by Trust
Companies, supra note 25, art. 7. More precisely, the report and filing procedures must
be done at the local CBRC authorities both in its own province and the province where
it plans to advertise and sell trust products.
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Certain trust companies, like ZRITIC (Heilongjiang), SITI (Shaanxi),
CRTrust (Sichuan), and New Times Trust (Inner Mongolia), have
surprisingly more funds under their names than one would presume
based on their location. After all, these places are all located in China’s
inland and are by no means outstanding either in terms of economic
development or financial innovation. It cannot be the case that the
investment advisers serving on these funds are predominantly from the
same province where the trust company runs its business, as there are
simply not so many advisers located in these provinces (the total number
of inland registered investment advisers in the whole Go-Goal database
is only 20). Instead, they must have created most of the funds by
attracting investment advisers from outside their own provinces.
The question then is how did such trust companies attract
investment advisers. One may argue that it is because these trust
companies provide good services. However, their services are not likely
to be so good as to compensate for the disadvantages associated with
locating in less developed areas. Given that a hedge fund is purely a
money-play business, it needs a cluster of either good brains
(experienced and skilled fund managers) or good money (wealthy, risktolerate investors) to develop in the first place. For a service provider
located in a city or province that does not possess the inherent advantage
to attract either good brains or good money, it may outperform its
counterparts located in those places with such inherent advantage only if
it can exhibit the innovation desired by the hedge fund managers. Thus,
it can grow into a good service provider as a result of improving its
service quality while accumulating more and more experience by
serving a lot of funds. This is exactly the route followed by SZITIC and
SITICO as the first movers of the Shenzhen and Shanghai models of
business, respectively. 140 It is hardly convincing that a not-so-welllocated and less-established trust company can manage to attract a good
number of funds purely by providing them with even-better services
than those trust companies already with better location and more
experience.

140. It was SITICO that first created and applied the “structured model” (i.e., the
Shanghai model) in setting up trusts. See http://www.sitico.com.cn/Sitico/all_info.jsp?i
d=13, which provides a brief introduction of SITICO.
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A more credible explanation to this question is actually quite
straightforward and practical. As mentioned before, a brokerage account
is needed in order to trade in China’s securities market. Before the lift of
the ban on partnerships’ opening securities accounts in China, there was
no better platform on which to base a hedge fund than a trust. As such,
the most fundamental attractiveness of a trust company to an investment
adviser is that it can open securities brokerage accounts based on the
trust product contracts in its hands.141 While new investment advisers are
always being incorporated, the number of trust companies is relatively
fixed,142 therefore there is only limited opportunity to work with wellknown trust companies like SZITIC. Moreover, the potential dark side
of those high-profile trust companies is that they are more prone to
being targeted by potential regulatory intervention. In comparison,
regulatory authorities arguably have less incentive to interfere with trust
companies in less developed inner lands, as the number of sunshine
funds created within their jurisdiction is still too small to trigger serious
worries. In this sense, the likelihood of a sunshine fund being targeted
by regulatory authorities 143 is lower in less developed areas, meaning
141. Guanyu xintuo touzi gongsi kaishe xintuo zhuanyong zhengquan zhanghu he
xintuo zhuanyong zijin zhanghu youguan wenti de tongzhi [Notice on the Relevant
Issues Concerning Trust and Investment Companies Opening Trust Exclusive Securities
Accounts and Capital Accounts] (jointly promulgated by the CSRC and CBRC, Sept.
10, 2004), available at http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?doc
ID=1085.
142. As financial institutions, trust companies are subject to the supervision of the
CBRC. A trust company can only be incorporated upon the approval of the CBRC and
must obtain a “Financial License.” The same approval is needed when a trust company
wants to change its business scope or open branch offices. See arts. 7, 11, and 12,
Xintuo gongsi guanli banfa [Measures for Administration of Trust Companies]
(promulgated by the CBRC on Jan. 23, 2007), LAWINFOCHINA, available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com.
143. Note that, a trust company does not have to obtain prior regulatory approval in
order to set up a new sunshine trust fund. It is, however, required to report to and file
with the local CBRC the necessary trust fund documents within 10 working days after
the fund’s inception. See Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities Investment
Trusts by Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 11. This said, prior review and approval
is needed if a trust company wants to open a securities brokerage account to hold
securities and engage secondary market trading. See Measures for Administration of
Securities Registration and Clearing, supra note 87. In this sense, regulatory authorities
can easily kill a fund by refusing to give it an account. However, given the suspension
on new securities accounts opening after July 2009, it is now impossible to open new
accounts for trust funds anyway. As such, many investment advisers ended up buying
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that it can be somehow easier and safer to establish a fund with the trust
companies there. As such, and because the trust platform and securities
trading accounts are needed regardless, investment advisers, particularly
those newly-formed, less-experienced ones, may have to turn to nonfirst-class trust companies even if they are located in less developed
parts of China.
Another important type of descriptive data is fund size. Such
information, however, is very hard to find, as most of the investment
advisers avoid disclosing to the public any information about the amount
of money under management, while others only say a vague number
aggregating all of their funds. Therefore, the data is mostly the expected
size as stated in the trust contracts/explanations of trust plans, instead of
the actual size as of fund inception. Similarly, funds are equally (if not
more) unwilling to publicize information regarding the number of
investors contributing capital. Therefore, it is impossible to know the
proportion of institutional investors versus individual investors in each
of the funds. Nevertheless, Figure 8, below, presents the distribution of
sizes of the funds in my sample, as a reference. It can be said that, at
least according to this chart, sunshine funds in China are still quite small
in size.

the previously-opened securities accounts from trust companies to set up new sunshine
funds. As already mentioned earlier in this Part, such practice is not lawful. As one
might imagine, if someday the relevant Chinese regulatory authorities decide to
investigate into such irregular practice, the likelihood for them to target those highprofile trust companies in richer provinces would be much higher, because these trust
companies tend to have a larger number of sunshine funds under their names, meaning
that the probability of discovering wrong doing will be higher.
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Figure 8
Size of Funds Included in my Sample

Compared to private equity funds, hedge funds can have a
perpetual term, 144 and investors can get in and out of the fund
periodically on those days the funds are open for redemption.145 That
said, most sunshine funds (90 out of 138) in China chose to have a fixed
term, and the funds having unlimited term are mostly from SZITIC.
Though not a big issue, adopting a fixed fund term is perhaps a safer
strategy for new market players testing the water of the hedge fund
business, so that potential risks will be contained in one fund for a
relatively short period of time. If the fund runs well, parties can always
choose to renew the term or transfer the fund into a perpetual one.

144. Jonathan Bevilacqua, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the Lines
between Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 260 (2006).
145. See George O. Aragon, Share Restrictions and Asset Pricing: Evidence from
the Hedge Fund Industry, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 33, 36 (2007).
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Figure 9
Term of Funds Included in my Sample
Term of Sunshine Funds (N=138)
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D. COVENANTS
Having examined general features such as fund inception years,
distribution of hosting trust companies, and fund sizes, I structured this
article to focus on contractual terms of sunshine funds, beginning with
the covenants. Before proceeding, I must make two points. First, the
covenants discussed in this section do not refer only to those written
explicitly under the “covenants section” of the contracts. Due to their
higher level of liquidity, hedge funds tend to present a less complex set
of issues regarding covenants and entitlement of compensation in
comparison to private equity funds. 146 Therefore, it is likely that the
covenants’ section of a contract would consist of only a few explicit
investment restrictions, while other more subtle, implicit covenants
would be scattered throughout the contract and interwoven with other
146. See Stephanie Breslow, Address at the New York City Bar Association
Conference: Issues in Structuring Ownership and Compensation Arrangements for
Private Investment Fund Managers – Hedge Funds (May 2006) (on file with author).
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relevant terms. As a result, a limited approach might leave important
covenants out of consideration. Instead, I take a broader approach to
examine restrictive covenants by reviewing each of the contracts as a
whole. Second, in grouping the covenants that appeared in sunshine
funds, I primarily follow the classification in Cumming and Johan’s
2006 paper because their sample included contracts from non-common
law countries.147 Presumably, their classification should be more suitable
for the purposes of this article, which deals with Chinese hedge fund
contracts, than that of Gompers and Lerner (1996), which was based
solely on U.S. contracts. 148 Needless to say, I made necessary
modifications and adaptations to the five categories to make them more
suitable for the Chinese hedge fund context.
1. Covenants on the Authority of Fund Managers Regarding
Investment Decisions
While the hedge fund business is essentially a bet on fund
managers’ personal skills and expertise in making good investment
decisions, such a game should not be left totally unchecked for the
purposes of preventing fund manager opportunism. In terms of
investment decisions, this means that sometimes fund managers might
have to honor certain percentage limitations on investment size. They
may also be obligated to pay dividends to investors periodically, rather
than letting the capital gains be automatically included into NAV for
reinvestments, at the expense of risking investors’ profits.
a. Restrictions on Investment Size
Although Chinese law does not specify mandatory limitations on
the size of investments by trust funds created by trust companies, 149
investment size is the most frequently used type of restriction among all
covenant categories. Out of the contracts of 60 sunshine funds that
explicitly provide information on restrictive covenants (usually in a
147.
148.
149.

Cumming & Johan, supra note 60, at 539.
Gompers & Lerner, supra note 46, at 477.
Chinese law only requires that a structured trust fund not invest more than 20%
of the fund’s total assets into the shares of one company. Other than that, it does not set
forth any other explicit restrictions on investment size by trust funds. See Notice of
China Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the Supervision of the
Structured Trust Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, art. 9.
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separate section named “Investment Restrictions”), there is no single
contract granting 100% freedom to its investment adviser in this respect,
although some variations do exist in terms of the approaches used to that
end, as shown in Table 4, below.
Table 4
Restrictions on Investment Size (N=60)
Restrictions on size of investments in any single security (e.g., stock, fund,
convertible notes, etc.)

Number
of Funds

Prescribed percentage restriction to be set aside if the consent of trust company is
obtained
Not more than certain percentage of the capital (total or outstanding) of the
invested company

24

Not more than certain percentage of the capital (total or outstanding) of the
invested company. To this end, the other investments by the funds under the
management of the same investment adviser shall also be counted

2

Not more than certain percentage of the capital (total or outstanding) of the
invested company. To this end, the other investments by the trust funds under the
management of the same trust company shall also be counted

10

Not more than certain percentage of the total trust assets

60

Not more than certain percentage of the portfolio containing the security

51

7

b. Covenants on Dividend Payouts
While restrictions on reinvestments are very important to private equity
funds, this issue is not so crucial in the hedge fund context. Note that,
hedge funds open periodically for subscription and redemption, e.g.,
once a month, once a quarter, or once a year, unlike PE funds that
restrict capital withdrawals for several years once invested. If a hedge
fund makes money while the fund manager does not want to pay
dividends, investors can simply ask to redeem their investments on an
open day at the then-higher NAV and leave the fund. The only
difference is that, in most cases, the leaving investor bears a redemption
fee, while dividends are received without a fee. Table 5, below,
summarizes the various solutions to the dividend payout issue as found
in 84 sunshine funds.
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Table 5:
Covenants on Dividend Payout
How should a decision on dividend payout be made? (N=84)
Dividends must be paid at pre-determined frequency and amount

Number of
Funds
3

Dividends must be paid at pre-determined frequency and amount, but only
subordinated investors can get dividends (for structured funds)

3

Sole decision of the investment adviser on whether to pay dividends or not

2

Joint decision of investment adviser and trust company on whether to pay
dividends or not
Sole decision of the trust company on whether to pay dividends or not

55

No dividend

12

9

Forms of dividend (N=74)
More trust units

42

More trust units, unless investors ask for cash dividends in advance

19

Cash or more trust units

12

Cash only

1

It can be seen from the Table above that in 66 of the 84 contracts,
the decision on whether to pay out a dividend is at the discretion of the
investment adviser and/or the trust company. Investors are far more
likely to get more trust units instead of getting paid cash. The Table thus
confirms the perception that a dividend payout is not a big deal in the
hedge fund context. That said, one should also recognize that dividend
payments can serve as a good signaling mechanism for investment
advisers and/or trust companies to show their confidence in maintaining
the funds’ profitability, thus effectively enhancing their reputation
among investors. Decisions to pay out dividends from time to time
despite the absence of contractual obligation to do so can help keep the
investor base at a reasonably stable size, because, otherwise, investors
may soon seek to have their trust units redeemed due to impatience or
disappointment. Relative to the practice of the past years, more sunshine
funds paid dividends in 2009, recognizing the importance of keeping
their investors after experiencing the dramatic plummet of Chinese stock
market in 2008.150 For practical reasons, a dividend payout also serves as
150. Zhang Ning, Biaogong huikui xinqie: yangguang simu fenhong [Reward for
Reputation: Many Sunshine Funds Pay Out Dividends], ZHENGQUAN SHIBAO
[SECURITIES TIMES], Jan. 18, 2010, available at http://news.stockstar.com/info/dartic
le.aspx?id=JL,20100118,00001378 [hereinafter, Zhang, Reward for Reputation].
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a tool to adjust funds’ NAV at times when investment advisers and/or
trust companies consider appropriate, e.g., to restore the trust unit price
to its starting value at the beginning of every year for the ease of
calculation.
2. Covenants on Fund Managers’ Capital Contributions
Under this category, I will discuss one very important and unique
feature of Chinese hedge funds contracts: a capital contribution by the
investment adviser, the de facto manager of a sunshine fund. To be sure,
a general partner contribution is not a novel idea per se. In order to
demonstrate that its interests are aligned with those of the limited
partners, a general partner normally needs to contribute into the fund
and thereby share in the good and bad times with limited partners.
Without this covenant in place, the general partner will be less
disciplined by the possible negative returns and risk, and may carelessly
squander other people’s money because the general partner has nothing
to lose. The amount of contribution is usually 1-5% in private equity
industry, depending on fund sizes and business focuses, 151 and
practitioners have submitted that the level for hedge funds is usually 1%
or even less.152 The general partner’s contribution is generally no more
than a slight percentage of the total fund assets because running a hedge
fund is a risky business. An excessive share of capital by the general
partner will backfire because fund managers may behave in a risk-averse
manner and make overly conservative investment decisions. Rather, the
combination of nominal capital contribution (1%) and substantial profit
sharing (20%) encourages fund managers to take necessary risks in
exchange for higher returns than other conservative investment vehicles,
such as mutual funds.

151. DAVID TOLL, PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERSHIP TERMS AND CONDITIONS 31 (2d
ed. 2001).
152. See Friedman, supra note 31; see also Breslow, supra note 146.
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Table 6
Capital Contributions and Holding by Investment Adviser
(N=70)153
Capital Contribution by the investment adviser as of fund inception (N=34)
Minimum contribution required for qualified investors in the fund154
Greater than the minimum contribution required for qualified investors, but
less than 10% of total fund assets155
10% of total fund assets
Greater than 10% of total fund assets

Number of
Funds
18
2
12
2

Minimum holding by the investment adviser during the fund term (N=55)
Less than 10% of total fund assets
10% of total fund assets

7
45

10% of total fund assets for the first few years of the fund

2

Greater than 10% of total fund assets

1

Percentage of incentive fees (if any) to be transferred into trust units upon each
NAV day if the investment adviser holds less than the minimum holding (N=48)
10% of incentive fees

12

20% of incentive fees

7

30% of incentive fees

1

153. All numbers in Table 6 are for unstructured funds. Structured funds are left out
of consideration because, although they always require investment advisers (as
subordinated class investors) to contribute and keep on holding a significant portion of
the total assets of the fund, see supra note 111 and accompanying text. The purpose of
doing so is to secure the fixed target return for their preferred investors. Therefore, they
are not really comparable to the typical U.S.-style hedge funds.
154. The minimum investment legally required to participate in a fund pooled by a
trust company is RMB 1 million, unless the trust contract prescribes for a higher
amount. See Administrative Measures for Collective Capital Trusts Established by
Trust Companies, supra note 25. An initial contribution clause requiring investment
advisers to pay the minimum capital contribution required for other qualified investors
in the fund is generally reasonable. It would normally result in the percentage of
investment adviser’s capital contribution being less than 10% (in most cases 2%), if the
calculation is determined by taking the minimum total capital required to set up the
fund as the total fund assets.
155. For those funds that require the investment adviser to pay/hold a fixed, upfront
contribution which is more than the minimum capital contribution required for qualified
investors in the fund, I calculated the percentage of investment adviser’s capital
contribution/holding versus the total fund assets by treating the minimum total capital
required to set up the fund as the total fund assets.
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50% of incentive fees
No limitation, until the minimum holding is reached

115
25
3

Percentage of incentive fees (if any) to be transferred into trust units, regardless if
the investment adviser holds less or more than the minimum holding (N=10)
50% of incentive fees, but only applicable for the first year of the fund’s
inception

8

15% of incentive fees, but investment adviser has full discretion over how and
when to dispose of the trust units transferred from incentive fees

1

100% of incentive fees, but investment adviser can, at discretion, ask the fund
to redeem such trust units transferred from incentive fees

1

Table 6, above, presents a picture of the contractual arrangements
in Chinese sunshine funds contracts dealing with the issues of
investment adviser capital contribution and holding. The difference is
straightforward. Instead of a nominal contribution and holding of around
1%, the prevailing industry practice in China seems to be 10%, at least
according to the Table above. Investment advisers can make their capital
contributions in two ways. They can contribute upon the inception of a
fund, or by transferring their incentive fees gradually until the required
minimum holding is reached. A 10% capital contribution requirement
would seem too excessive relative to the 20% profit sharing mechanism,
which would dampen investment advisers’ incentives to take risks and
over-perform. Note that, in order to satisfy such high capital
contribution threshold, investment advisers may need to put a very
significant portion of their personal wealth into the fund. If they manage
to make good investments and bring in profits for the fund, they can
only increase their personal wealth to a rather limited extent (10%
capital contribution for 20% profit, compared with 1% capital
contribution for 20% profit). However, if the fund underperforms, the
fund managers get severely penalized as they lose a lot of their assets
and will also find it difficult to raise follow-on funds.156 Unfortunately,
the number of funds requiring such excessive capital contribution is not
small.
Although the second method of capital contribution does not
require the investment adviser to contribute all of the required capital
156. THOMAS MEYER & PIERRE-YVES MATHONET, BEYOND THE J-CURVE:
MANAGING A PORTFOLIO OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 34 (2005).
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upfront, it is still unfavorable because the requirement cuts into their
incentive fees. After all, it might take some time before the investment
adviser achieves the 10% threshold. This said, investment advisers
arguably would prefer the second method to the first one, as they do not
have to pay the whole capital contribution entirely from their own
pockets. In other words, they are not made unduly risk-averse from the
very beginning, and can still pursue an aggressive investment strategy to
impress their investors at relatively low cost. In this sense, the second
alternative better aligns the incentives of the investors and investment
advisers. Among the contracts/explanations of trust plans of all the 70
unstructured funds that provide information on the issue of investment
adviser capital contribution and holding, 26 contracts are from SZITIC,
and it is worth noting that all 26 contracts have followed the second
method. Arguably, this perhaps explains SZITIC’s success in China’s
hedge fund industry: investment advisers are willing to choose SZITIC
because their terms appear more reasonable from the adviser’s point of
view, and such reasonableness is delivered with certainty.
A more important question under this topic is why a much higher
level of capital contribution from investment advisers emerged in China
in the first place. This mechanism was not in the trust contract of
PureHeart, the very first Chinese hedge fund created by Mr. Zhao
Danyang on the trust platform provided by SZITIC in 2004. Instead, the
contract of PureHeart looked quite like a typical U.S. hedge fund in
important respects, such as the 20% flexible performance fee. So if the
whole industry in China was started by transplanting an already welltested business model, why do we now observe such a crucial difference
in practice with respect to capital contribution and holding by
investment advisers (general partners)? Three important reasons, in my
opinion, provide possible answers to this question.
a. Concerns of Chinese Investors
One has to bear in mind that China has a civil law history. In such a
country, statutes tend to be considered more serious than contractual
terms in the sense that people believe that default legal provisions are
more reliable than contractual arrangements, even when the former are
often too rigid, formal and sometimes outdated, while the latter are
carefully tailored to suit the specific business needs of the parties. A
typical example to illustrate this point is the minimum capital
requirement for setting up a company. Though a long abandoned idea in
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common law countries like the U.S. and United Kingdom, Chinese
people still seem to attach a lot of importance to the requirement and the
amount of registered capital is often directly associated with the quality
of a company.157 A high capital contribution number on a company’s
registry documents gives its investors and creditors some “sense of
security” about the money they are going to inject into company; 158
while a company with only nominal registered capital is very likely to
be perceived as a paper sham.159 As a matter of fact, minimum capital
requirement is also very often referred to by lawmakers in setting out
qualifications for the relevant market players.160 For example, in order to
be retained by a trust company as a third-party adviser for its trust funds,
an investment management company or partnership must have at least
157. Liu Yongguang, Riben gongsi ziben zhidu gaige de lifa shijian jiqi dui woguo
de qishi [Reform of Company Capital System Legislation in Japan and What Can We
Learn From It], (1) FASHANG YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW AND BUSINESS] 30, 31-32
(2004).
158. Zhou Yu, Ziben xinyong shenhua de zhongjie [The End of the Capital Credit
Legend], (2) DONGSHIHUI [DIRECTORS & BOARDS] 88, 88 (2006), available at
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060207/18252323393.shtml.
159. Id. Around the end of the 1980s, China witnessed a wave of new company
establishments. Because there lacked legal authority to regulate corporations (Chinese
company law first came into being only in 1993), many sham companies were set up
without capital in them, and many abusive and fraudulent business activities were found
to be associated with these companies. It was against this background that Chinese
company law was enacted, with relatively high registered capital requirements. See Jin
Jianfeng, Gongsi renge fouren lilun jiqi zai woguo de shijian [The Theory of Disregard
of Corporate Personality and its Implementation in China], (2) ZHONGGUO FAXUE
[CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE] 118, 122-123 (2005). As such, it is quite likely that a company
with only nominal registered capital may leave people with the impression that it is a
paper sham.
160. Many laws and regulations in China, as long as they involve setting out the
qualifications for certain market players (e.g., what qualifications must be met in order
to be able to engage in certain business), include requirements for the minimum capital
in a company. In these cases, the default minimum capital requirements as set out in
Chinese Company Law are no longer applicable. See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
gongsi fa [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993) (amended Dec. 25, 1999, Aug. 28, 2004, and Oct. 27,
2005), LAWINFOCHINA, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com, arts. 26 and 81. For
a tip-of-the-iceberg picture of the different minimum capital requirements for
companies in various lines of business, see http://www.investsjs.gov.cn/a/service/touz
iliucheng/1355.html.
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RMB 10 million paid up capital; 161 as for a trust company, the law
requires for at least RMB 300 million registered capital, which must be
already fully paid up.162
By the same token, investors in China may find it hard to accept
when a fund manager is going to use their money at his discretion and
share one-fifth of what they are going to earn, while the manager only
contributes a nominal amount relative to what investors have invested.
In some sense, this could also sound like a sham. Comparatively, a 10%
capital contribution will better bind the adviser, and the business will
look more serious in the eyes of investors. Given that the idea of hedge
funds is still so novel, and that the whole scheme is based on contracts,
the requirement that investment adviser contributes at least 10% of the
fund’s total assets serves as a quasi-legal mechanism to provide the
needed sense of security to investors. This argument echoes the thesis of
a paper by Professors Lerner and Schoar in 2005.163 They found that, in
a private equity investment context, transactions in low enforcement and
civil law nations tend to use common stock and debt, and rely on more
rigid yet straightforward mechanisms such as equity and board control
to monitor portfolio companies, instead of convertible preferred stock,
which is more flexible yet more contractual in nature, as seen in
common law countries. 164 Similarly, the higher investment adviser
contribution requirement used in the Chinese hedge fund contract
context serves as a more rigid and straightforward mechanism to make
up for the general unfamiliarity and uncertainty of Chinese investors
towards the new business, reflecting of the civil law culture in China.
b. Liability Concerns of Trust Companies
If an investment adviser underperforms and the sunshine fund
under its management loses money, the reputation of the trust company
will also be negatively affected because the fund is created and operated
under its name. From a formal point of view, a trust company is the one
signing the trust contract directly with the investors, while the
investment adviser is standing one step back being the third-party
161. See Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities Investment Trusts by
Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 22.
162. See Measures for Administration of Trust Companies, supra note 142, art. 10.
163. Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial
Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity, 120 Q.J. ECON. 223 (2005).
164. Id. at 223.
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service provider retained by the trust company through an advisory
service agreement. As such, a trust company would have the incentive to
preserve its reputation as a reliable market player. It need to have some
reliable mechanisms to ensure that if the investment adviser fails to
bring in good returns for a sunshine fund, disgruntled investors of that
fund will not make its life too difficult. With a high investment adviser
capital contribution at the outset, the investors may feel that their losses
are at least partially shared by the person who caused the losses.
Otherwise, annoyed investors will first blame the trust company for not
installing a mechanism to hold the investment adviser accountable, and
liability on the part of trust company may even be triggered. In this
sense, it is understandable that most trust companies have included this
requirement in their contracts, despite the incentive-dampening effect it
is likely to have on investment advisers.
c. Legal Restrictions
A recent regulation, namely, Guidelines on Running the Business
of Securities Investment Trusts by Trust Companies, which took effect
in February 2009,165 permitted trust companies to charge management
fees and performance-based compensation by virtue of running
securities investment trusts business. However, performance-based
compensation can only be paid as of the termination of a trust, provided
that the trust has been profitable.166 Furthermore, the fees incurred as a
result of retaining third-party investment advisers should only be paid
out of the management fees and performance-based compensation
charged by the trust company from investors. 167 This means that the
investment adviser will have problems getting its incentive fees on a
regular basis, as the trust company cannot get its performance-based
compensation until the fund’s termination in the first place. However, if
the investment adviser contributes a higher level of capital into a fund
and thus gets more trust units in return, such regulatory restriction can
be circumvented by paying dividends or “special trust interests” from
165. Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities Investment Trusts by Trust
Companies, supra note 25.
166. Id. art. 18.
167. Id. art. 21.

120

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

time to time to the investment adviser based on its holding of trust units.
In this respect, a higher level of capital contribution by the adviser as
seen in many sunshine funds contracts is even necessary under the
current Chinese regulatory framework. This issue will be discussed in
more detail in Part III.E.
3. Covenants on Types of Investment
This category of covenants serves to limit investment advisers
specifically with respect to certain risky securities. Within the sunshine
funds context, I identify two important types of covenants under this
category, namely, restriction on types of investment and the decision
power on expanding investment scope of a fund. Findings on the two
types of covenants are summarized and presented in the two Tables,
below.
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Table 7
Covenants on Types of Investment (N=60)
Covenants
Restrictions on investing in stocks that forecast future loss
Not allowed at all
Not allowed until the company’s performance is officially published
Certain percentage restriction applies until the company’s performance is
officially published
Allowed, if jointly agreed by the trust company and investment adviser

Number of
Funds
4
5
18
1

Restrictions on investing in special treatment (“ST”) stocks and/or other securities
issued by ST companies
Not allowed at all

30

Allowed but with certain percentage restrictions

11

Allowed, if agreed by the trust company
Default percentage restrictions to be forfeited if approved by the investors of the
trust

24
2

Restriction on investing in derivatives (e.g., warrants)
Not allowed at all
Not allowed to actively buy in derivatives on secondary markets
Allowed but with certain percentage restrictions
Allowed plus certain percentage restrictions if approved by the investors of the
trust

5
2
19
1

Restrictions on engaging in short selling/margin trading
Not allowed at all
Allowed, if approved by the investors of the trust

22
3

Allowed, if agreed by the trust company

23

Restrictions on investing in ChiNext168 stocks
Allowed but with certain percentage restrictions

2

168. ChiNext is specially tailored to list those enterprises engaged in independent
innovation and other growing venture enterprises. It was only officially launched on
Oct. 23, 2009. See Samuel Shen & Fion Li, China launches second board for start-ups,
REUTERS, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.comarticle/2009/10/23/chine
xt-launch-idUSSHA27095520091023.
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Restrictions on investing in the securities of related parties169
Not allowed to invest in securities of the trust company as well as the related
parties thereof

18

Not allowed to invest in securities of the companies that are related parties of the
investment adviser

6

Not allowed to engage in non-arms length transactions among other funds as
managed by the same trust company and/or the investment adviser

1

Not allowed to invest in those securities that may involve personal interests of
the trust company and the investment adviser, and the managers thereof

1

Restrictions on investing in an exchange-traded fund (“ETF”)
Only trade ETF within an exchange
Obligation to invest certain percent of trust assets in securities with at least “neutral”
or “hold” rating

3
5

169. Note that the law does not generally prohibit related party transactions by trust
companies, provided that they are carried out with fair market price and reported to the
CBRC in advance on a transaction-by-transaction basis. See Measures for
Administration of Trust Companies, supra note 142, art. 35.
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Table 8
Decisions Needed to Broaden Investment Scope (N=110)
How can a decision of investment scope expansion be made?
Investment scope not changeable
All of the principals’ consent must be sought

Number
of Funds
1
2

Half of the principals need to approve

13

Sole decision by trust company but consent of investment adviser should be sought

11

Sole decision by trust company provided that advance notice is made on its website

2

Joint consultation and decision by the trust company and investment adviser

75

Sole decision by investment adviser, once the trust company permits it to do so

4

Sole decision by investment adviser

2

In particular, Cumming and Johan’s 2006 paper finds that private
equity funds in civil law countries are more likely to have covenants
pertaining to the types of investment than private equity funds in
common law countries. 170 Since no research was presented regarding
covenants in hedge fund partnership contracts, I cannot say whether
their conclusion is also true within the hedge fund context by comparing
the covenants from the two systems. However, one may have the
impression from looking at the covenants summarized in the above two
Tables that investment advisers have limited freedom in terms of the
types of investments they can make. Hedge funds in developed countries
usually advertise themselves as being able to make use of a wide range
of sophisticated financial instruments and transactions for the purposes
of delivering absolute returns. Apparently, Chinese hedge funds are far
more limited in that regard. In essence, they are still at the stage of being
“stock trading funds” rather than real “hedge funds.” This being said,
the current cautious approach of allowing only limited types of
investment is however understandable and even worthwhile, given that
the Chinese capital market is a huge laboratory itself where many new
things are still to be tested.
It is important to note one particular point about the data presented
above. Despite some variations, it is apparent that the trust company
170.

Cumming & Johan, supra note 60, at 571.
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plays quite a role in terms of deciding what kind of investments are to be
made or not, as well as whether to allow the investment scope expansion.
As already mentioned above, a trust company is more like a service
provider than a de facto fund manager for the sunshine funds created
under its name.171 Decisions regarding which securities to invest in, at
what price to buy in or sell out, and the number to be bought in or sold
out, are all made by the investment adviser and contained in a document
called the “investment plan.” A trust company normally is there only to
conduct a formality check upon the investment plan before executing it.
It is a “formality check” in that the trust company will only refuse to
carry out the investment plan if the recommendations contained in the
investment plan involve investments violating the relevant legal
requirements or contractual stipulations in the trust contract, or when
exogenous reasons make it impossible to trade a stock as of the time of
the investment plan, e.g., when that stock is suspended from trading
during preparations for periodic reporting. Thus, the trust company is
not there to judge whether the specific investment decisions made by the
adviser in the investment plan, i.e., those regarding how, when and at
what price to dispose of certain securities, are good or bad. 172 That said,
a trust company does retain an important right allowing it to have a say
over issues on a more general level, such as what kind of securities can a
fund invest in and what kind of transactions can a fund engage in. As
can be seen from the two Tables above, if an investment adviser wants
to invest in risky assets, such as special treatment stocks or warrants, or
deploy risky trading strategies, such as short selling, or want to have a
more liberal investment scope, it is most likely that the adviser has to
ask for the trust company’s permission. Therefore, compared with a
manager in a classic hedge fund partnership, an investment adviser to a
Chinese sunshine fund enjoys most but not full discretion in making
investment decisions, and there are times that the trust company may
interfere, mostly on formal and general issues. Again, the reason here
relates to the liability concern of trust companies. Since their reputation
and interests are on the line if the investments in risky assets lead to
investors’ losses, they have the incentive to retain the power of deciding
whether to allow their advisers to do so in the first place.

171.
172.

See supra note 107 and the accompanying text.
Summarized based on contracts in my sample. See also id.
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4. Covenants on Fund Operation
This category of covenants covers those issues regarding the
general management and operation of a sunshine fund. Some covenants
shown in the Table below can also fall under the previous sub-category
of investment types. Table 9, below, provides a summary of the usage of
this kind of covenants in 60 sunshine funds contracts that explicitly
provide information on restrictive covenants (usually in a separate
section named “Investment Restrictions”). To avoid misunderstanding, I
excluded covenants that deal with those restrictions already expressly
stipulated in the relevant statutes.173
Table 9
Covenants on Fund Operation Issues (N=60)*
Covenants
Not to invest the trust assets in a way that unlimited liability might be incurred

Number of
Funds
7

Not to invest the trust assets in companies that might be convicted of violating
laws and regulations

2

Not to invest all trust assets in order to keep certain liquidity

8

Not to buy any securities within certain days

174

before the expiration of fund term

4

Not to buy any securities whose applicable lock-in period falls after the expiration
of the fund term

4

Not to operate the fund with borrowed debt

5

* Sample size is 60 because there are 60 sunshine funds contracts that explicitly provide information on
restrictive covenants (usually in a separate section named “Investment Restrictions”). The numbers do
not add up to 60 because some contracts simply do not touch upon certain covenants under this type in
their “Investment Restrictions” section.

173. For example, there are eight funds in my sample prohibiting using the trust
assets to extend loans or attach any encumbrance thereon. Such a covenant, however, is
not included in Table 9 because there is an explicit statutory provision saying that trust
companies shall refrain from using the trust assets for purposes other than ones
stipulated in the trust contract, nor should they use trust assets to provide collateral for
others. See Measures for Administration of Trust Companies, supra note 142, art. 34.
174. Such time limits are: Western Trust Cheng Nuo No.1: 14 trading days; Western
Trust Mingyuan Bakelai; 14 trading days; BJITIC Tong Wei Value Increase: 15 trading
days; and FOTIC Ying Rong Da No. 1: 5 trading days.
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5. Limitation of Investment Adviser’s Power
The last category of covenants is also unique to Chinese hedge
funds. Essentially, these covenants deal with a situation where an
investment adviser will lose all of its power and the trust company will
take over. This could happen both in the case of a particular security in a
fund’s portfolio, and in the case of the fund as a whole. The happening
of the latter will directly lead to the termination of the sunshine fund.
The right of a trust company to dispose securities in a fund without
consulting the investment adviser is called the “special transaction right.”
To be sure, this section does not lend itself to talking about the general
circumstances in which a trust company has the right to terminate a
sunshine fund. After all, technically it is the trust company and not the
investment adviser who creates a sunshine fund; it follows that the trust
company will also have a termination right. There can be a set of such
circumstances where the termination will simply be a natural and logical
outcome thereof. For example, the trust company can terminate a fund
when all the beneficiaries (i.e., investors) decide so; when the core
managers of the investment adviser leave and there is no one else to
replace them; when the investment adviser cooperates with other trust
companies to launch similar trust funds without obtaining prior consent
of the current trust company; or when the fund is so under-subscribed
that its NAV is lower than a defined minimum amount for a certain
period of time.
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Table 10
Trust Companies’ Special Transaction Right (N=112)
Triggers of the Special Transaction Right
Trust company has reason to believe that certain securities should not be held and
thus sells them
If the unit value of trust assets falls under certain threshold,175 then trust company
has the right to sell all trust assets to cash out. The trust will be terminated as a
result.
50%

Number of
Funds
75
66
28

60%

3

70%

21

80%
>80%
Percentage not specified
For the purpose of keeping enough cash for redemption and liquidity needs of the
fund, and to the extent that cash needs are satisfied
Value of any stock in the portfolio falls under certain threshold, then sell that stock

2
9176
3
8
5

60%

1

70%

4

The situations listed Table 10, above, however, are of a different
nature. In these cases, the decision of the trust company to sell a security
or even to terminate a fund by selling all of the securities therein is a
substantive one. The first category of triggers allows a trust company to
sell certain securities if it has reason to believe that they should not be
held. It encompasses, for example, the right of a trust company to sell a
175. Note that although a trust company should impose certain appropriate “alert
thresholds” depending on the nature of a trust fund and the market trends, and also
diligently keep track of the market on a daily basis, it is not a mandatory statutory
requirement to also have a “loss-stopping threshold.” A “loss-stopping threshold”
entitles the trust company to sell trust assets and stop losses for a trust fund. Whether to
include a “loss-stopping threshold” clause is left to the discretion of the business parties,
and if they do agree on the clause in the trust contract, the trust company should take
action accordingly. See Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities Investment
Trusts by Trust Companies, supra note 25, art. 14. That said, Chinese law makes it
mandatory that trust companies impose “loss-stopping thresholds” for structured trust
funds, so as to limit losses for preferred class investors. See Notice of China Banking
Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the Supervision of the Structured Trust
Business of Trust Companies, supra note 109, art. 9.
176. This includes eight structured funds.
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security when the investment adviser (or together with its related parties)
holds more than 5% of that stock. However, this is not the real point of
the special transaction right embodied in this trigger, as selling the stock
to make its holding fall back under 5% is merely for legal compliance
purposes, otherwise a disclosure will have to be made.177 Rather, it deals
more with the situation when, for example, the market falls 3% in one
day or 8% accumulatively for two consecutive days, or the value of the
any stock falls under 90% of its initial cost, or trading volume of any
stock doubles for two consecutive days.178 Upon the occurrence of any
of these listed scenarios, the trust company will be alerted and ready
take further actions, if necessary. It is no longer bound by the decisions
of the investment adviser any more, even if it chooses to consult with
the investment adviser first about the possible solutions. It can directly
decide to sell the concerned security to stop further losses, even if the
adviser wants to keep it for a longer period.
As to the second category of triggers, selling thresholds (i.e., lossstopping thresholds) higher than 80% of the original NAV are mostly
found within structured, as opposed to unstructured, fund contracts. The
selling threshold for structured fund contracts is generally higher
because investment advisers need to meet the fixed target return for their
preferred class of investors, thus leading to a more acute need to limit
loss than for unstructured fund contracts. Moreover, there is normally
also a “capital add-in threshold” to serve as the first-step buffer before
the selling threshold is reached. Therefore, a structured fund will only be
terminated if the subordinated investors are not willing to contribute
new capital into the fund to make up for the loss, and the fund’s NAV
keeps falling toward the selling threshold. In any case, cashing out all
securities and terminating a fund is a substantive right of the trust
company leading to a serious outcome, as it deprives the investment
adviser of the chance to reverse the losses by changing its strategy and
trying again.
177. If an investor’s holdings reach 5% of the issued shares of a listed company, a
disclosure must be made within three days. See art. 13, Shangshi gongsi shougou guanli
banfa [Regulations on the Takeover of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the CSRC,
July 31, 2006) (amended Aug. 27, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA, available at
http://www.lawinfochina.com.
178. These circumstances are expressly stipulated in SZITIC trust contracts, and the
trust company may, upon the occurrence of such circumstances, exercise its special
transaction right to sell a stock without consulting the investment adviser. Trust
contracts from other trust companies have similar stipulations of such circumstances.
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It is not hard to understand why so many trust companies choose to
retain the special transaction rights. As the party signing the trust
contract with investors directly, a trust company bears more risk than the
investment adviser of becoming the target of a lawsuit if the fund’s
losses make investors unhappy. In this sense, the existence of a special
transaction rights can serve as a liability exemption or reduction
disclaimer against the accusation that “the trust company has failed to
fulfill its duty to monitor the investment adviser and stop losses.” 179
Such disclaimer, although effectively limiting the potential liabilities
that may be charged upon trust companies, comes at the cost of
sacrificing investment advisers’ decision power in very important
circumstances. In this sense, trust companies are not merely playing the
role of transaction executors, but also the role of substantive decision
makers in Chinese hedge funds. As long as trust companies are
providing investment advisers with the trust platform on which to base
sunshine funds, it is not likely for them to give up their special
transaction rights. Industry practitioners thus would be curiously
anticipating the prospective development of limited-partnershiporganized hedge funds, especially in terms of their potential to
overcome the inherent shortcomings (such as special transaction rights)
of trust-organized ones.
E. COMPENSATION
Since sunshine funds are based on trusts, the compensation
mechanisms in their contracts also have some unique aspects that reflect
this fact. In simple words, the fixed and flexible fees paid by investors
of a fund are shared between the investment adviser and the trust
company, with the former taking a larger portion. The following two
Tables summarize some important features of compensation

179. Such an accusation was raised by investors in a lawsuit against SZITIC, as a
result of the huge losses (more than 60%) of Xinpeng No. 1, a sunshine fund created
under its name. See Dan Youwei, Huarun xintuo yu kehu duibu gongtang: cheng
Xinpeng 1 qi bucunzai qizha [SZITIC Responded on the Lawsuit Brought by Its Clients:
We Did Not Defraud on Xinpeng Trust Contract], SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO
[SHANGHAI SECURITIES NEWS], Dec. 22, 2009, available at http://news.hexun.com/20
09-12-22/122110286.html.
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mechanisms of 82 sunshine funds in my sample that provided
information on fees and compensation.
Table 11
Fee Levels of Sunshine Funds (N=82)*
Flexible Fees:
Investment Adviser /
Trust Company
Combination = 20%
12% / 8%
15% / 5%
16% / 4%

Fixed Fees:
Number
of
Funds
67
1
3
1

17% / 3%
17.5% / 1.5%
18% / 2%
18.5% / 1.5%

37
1
3
4

20% / 0%
Combination > 20%
19% / 3%**
20% / 2%
30% / 0%
35% / 0%

17
5
1
2
1
1

Investment***
Adviser
0%
0.25%
0.30%
0.40%

0.50%
0.75%
1%
1.50%

Fixed Fees:
Number
of
Funds
11
24
1
2

12
5
2
2

Trust
Company***
0.50%
0.75%
0.90%
1.00%
Fixed amount +
extra 1% if NAV
is greater than
100% of its
original value
1.15%
1.25%
1.30%
1.30% if fund size
as of inception is
not greater than
100 million + 1%
for the portion
exceeding 100
million if the fund
size as of inception
is over 100 million
1.50%
1.70%
1.75%
2%

Number
of
Funds
4
1
1
32
1

1
6
7
1

12
1
1
1

* The numbers in the Table might not add up to 82 because in some cases, the specific proportion of
split is not given.
** This proportion is only applicable during the first year of the fund. Afterwards, the proportion is
changed into 17%/3%. See the contract of SZITIC Hengda Tonghui No.1.
*** The two columns of fixed fees should be read separately from each other. They are sorted from low
to high under each column, but the numbers in the same row are not related to each other, e.g., the 0%
and 0.5% in the first row does not mean a 0%/5% split of fixed fees between adviser and trust company.

2012]

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TRUST
CONTRACTS OF CHINESE HEDGE FUNDS

131

Table 12
Usage of High Water Mark (N=78)
Usage of High Water Mark
Typical high water mark, with hurdle rate
Typical high water mark, no hurdle rate
Hurdle rate, no high water mark
Revised or no high water mark, no hurdle rate

Number
of Funds
2
65
3
8

Difference between the NAV of the compensation payment day and the purchase
price of trust units

2

Flexible fees paid yearly, based on the difference of the NAV of year end between
the NAV of year beginning

1

Difference between the NAV of the current compensation payment day and the
NAV of the last payment day

1

Highest historical NAV during the past 12 months

4

Similar to the typical hedge fund industry practice, the
performance-based flexible fees in Chinese sunshine funds also largely
cluster at 20%. However, what is different is that the 20% needs to be
split between the investment adviser and the trust company, and the
most frequently seen proportion of such a split is 17% to the investment
adviser and 3% to the trust company. Fixed management fees are also
split; however, if adding the investment adviser’s portion with the trust
company’s portion, the sum does not cluster at 2%. As shown in Table
11, above, the level of fixed management fees charged by trust
companies is generally at a higher level than that charged by investment
advisers. The usage of a high water mark is also identified as a prevalent
practice among sunshine funds. A high water mark is defined in most
contracts as the highest historical NAV; it has been used in a few
contracts with twists to this meaning to make the conditions of
compensation payouts less stringent, as shown in Table 12, above.
As already mentioned in Part III.D.2, a regulation that took effect in
February 2009 introduced into the industry some very strange legal
requirements. According to that regulation, performance-based
compensation can only be paid as of the termination of a trust provided
that the trust remains profitable.180 Furthermore, the fees incurred as a
result of retaining third-party investment advisers should only be paid
180.

See supra note 166 and the accompanying text.

132

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

out of the management fees and performance-based compensation
charged by the trust company from investors. 181 Such requirements
might be well-meant. For example, it may be that the regulatory
authorities do not want investors to bear the obligation of paying
sunshine funds managers (trust company and investment adviser) on a
periodic basis, when the NAV of these funds can be so volatile182 that, in
the end, investors will only earn nominal returns compared to the
accumulated amount of fees they have paid out. They may also have
gotten the inspiration from the compensation mechanism of private
equity funds, which normally require general partners to return part or
all of the capital committed or invested by limited partners before they
can share the 20% carried interests.183
Moreover, it is interesting to note that certain changes have been
evolving among hedge funds as a result of the shock to the industry
brought about by the 2008 financial crisis. According to Job Search
Digest’s 2010 Hedge Fund Compensation Report, many funds are
contemplating a new form of partnership with their LPs in exchange for
money being locked in for a longer period of time.184 For this purpose,
they will, among other things, charge the incentive fee in two or threeyear rolling cycles as opposed to the current norm of annual or semiannual payment. In this respect, the hedge fund industry’s compensation
structure is also partially converging toward that of the private equity
industry.185
Although making perfect sense within a private equity context
where long-horizon investments and lack of liquidity are the norm, the
arrangement that carried interest is only payable upon the investors’
recoupment of their contributed capital might not be an ideal solution to
incentivizing hedge funds managers. Hedge fund incentive fees are often
viewed as having option-like characteristics.186 Incentive fees are earned
181.
182.

See supra note 167 and the accompanying text.
Indeed, it has been submitted that Chinese hedge funds in general still lack the
ability to maintain a relatively stable level of high returns. Rather, their NAV curves are
quite volatile, which is also a result of the high volatility of the Chinese stock market.
See Zhang, Reward for Reputation, supra note 150.
183. TOLL, supra note 151, at 51.
184. Job Search Digest, The 2010 Hedge Fund Compensation Report 11 (2010) (on
file with author).
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Carl Ackermann et al., The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk,
Return and Incentives, 54 J. OF FIN. 833, 840 (1999); see also William N. Goetzmann et
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when the fund’s performance exceeds a high-water mark, which is
analogous to a call option with the high-water mark as the strike price.
Managers are incentivized to work hard and keep the fund value above
the high-water mark in order to assure that their incentive options will
finish in the money.187 However, if they can only exercise their options
at the end of the game, but not periodically throughout the life of the
fund, their incentives are dampened. Opportunistic fund managers may
fail to manage their funds diligently until they approach the end of their
terms. For example, if they lose money during a certain period, they
may feel a less urgent need to adjust their trading strategy to stop the
losses and recoup some of their losses as soon as possible, as they will
not be rewarded even if they indeed manage to make money for the next
period and there is enough time to try out before the end of fund term
anyway. Alternatively, they could choose to comfortably maintain a
conservative trading strategy so that they can secure a modest
compensation at the termination. Either way, it is unlikely that fund
managers will constantly exert their best efforts to maximize the net
asset value when running the fund. This is apparently not in the best
interest of the investors. Different from private equity, the primary focus
of hedge funds on active short term trading of public securities requires
fund managers to actively monitor the market and work consistently to
trade in and out; otherwise many money-making or loss-stopping
opportunities may be missed in the blink of an eye. In this respect, the
one-time-at-termination compensation system may work poorly despite
its well-meant intention.
Regardless of the real motive for regulators to impose such
apparently strange requirements, the rules are already promulgated and
industry players should comply. It would thus be natural to predict that
funds created as of February 2009, the effectuation date of the
Guidelines on Running the Business of Securities Investment Trusts by
Trust Companies, should have complied by changing the language of
their compensation clauses to allow payment of flexible fees only upon
termination. This is because performance-based compensation can only
al., supra note 33, at 1687; James E. Hodder & Jens Carsten Jackwerth, Incentive
Contracts and Hedge Fund Management, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 811,
812 (2007).
187. Hodder & Jackwerth, supra note 186.
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be paid at the termination of a profitable trust pursuant to the
regulation. 188 However, a look at the contracts in my sample—
recognizing the limited nature of the sample 189 —does not seem to
support such a prediction. Only one unstructured fund190 out of the 55
fund contracts that (a) were dated prior to or in February 2009 and (b)
contained information on trust company and/or investment adviser
compensation stipulated for compensation payment upon termination.
After this cut-off point, only two unstructured funds191 out of 27 fund
contracts that were (a) dated after February 2009 and (b) contained
information on trust company and/or investment adviser compensation
stipulated for compensation payment upon termination.192 Given such an
apparently low rate of compliance with the February 2009 regulations,
one may wonder what strategies trust companies and investment
advisers might have crafted to adapt to the unfavorable legal
requirements. As far as my sample shows, four strategies can be
identified.
.
1. Temporarily No Performance-Based Compensation; to be
Resumed if Allowed by Law in the Future
The point of this strategy is that once the ban is lifted by a new law
and the fund managers (trust company and investment adviser) are
188.
See supra notes 165-67.
189.
See supra Parts III.A, III.B for a discussion of the limitations of the sample.
The reader is reminded that the sample consists of unexecuted documents obtained
from online sources, and that the sample covers approximately one-sixth of the
sunshine funds listed in the Go-Goal database as of August 9, 2010.
190. I only refer to unstructured funds here because structured fund fees are
normally paid at termination with or without the 2009 regulation in place, given that
these funds normally only have less than five years of life by their design anyway, see
supra note 124. The name of this unstructured fund is Western Trust Cheng Nuo No. 1.
191. The two funds are: CRTrust Xin Lan Rui No. 2 and XMITIC Puer Qilin.
192. Among the 27 funds, there is one fund, namely, SZITIC Tong Wei No. 1, that
did not seem to adopt any particular strategy to mitigate against unfavorable regulations.
Arguably, I would not consider this a case of non-compliance, because the fund was
officially set up in March 2009. Normally, it would take some time before fund
managers could raise enough capital from investors and then officially set up a fund.
Therefore, the March establishment of SZITIC Tong Wei No. 1 very likely shows that
the trust documents were already executed by investors earlier than February 2009, thus
making the regulation not applicable to the fund.
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allowed to charge fees periodically again, the new fees to be charged
then will be substantially raised to make up for the previous loss of fees.
This strategy has been adopted by one fund.193
2. Trust Companies’ Fixed Fees and Flexible Compensation
Combined Together and Called “Trust Management Fee”;
Investment Advisers’ Flexible Incentive Fees Received as
“Special Trust Interests”
Although this strategy sounds like a “words game,” it has been
employed by seven funds.194 The rationale behind this strategy is quite
straightforward. Previously, trust companies’ compensation was usually
expressed as consisting of two portions, namely, a fixed fee (in most
cases 1%) and a performance-based compensation (in most cases 3%, as
shown in Table 11, above). Since the requirement in the 2009 regulation
only limits the payment of performance-based compensation and not the
fixed part,195 the limitations can be circumvented if the trust company is
only going to receive a fixed fee and not flexible one. As such, what
these seven funds did was to increase the level of the fixed management
fee, effectively covering the flexible fee. The investment adviser will
share with the trust company the fixed fee, without charging a
performance-based “fee” in exchange for its “investment advisory
services.” What it will receive is the so-called “special trust interest” as
a result of its identity as the “special beneficiary” of the sunshine fund.
There is usually one clause at the very beginning of fund contracts that
requires fund investors to agree to appoint the investment adviser as the
“special beneficiary.” This appointment, coupled with the fact that an
investment adviser is usually required to contribute and hold at least 10%
of the fund’s capital, will fortify its right to receive “special trust
interests.” These trust interests are special in that they are paid more
frequently, such as monthly or quarterly, are paid based on high water
mark, and are paid prior to the receipt by normal investors of their
“ordinary trust interests.” Essentially, this arrangement resembles the
193.
194.

This fund is called Ping An Fortune Tong Wei No. 1.
These seven funds are: SZITIC He Ying Fine Selection No.1, SZITIC Zhi
Cheng No. 2, No. 3, No.4 and No. 5, SZITIC Hengda Tonghui No. 1, and FOTIC
Steady Value Increase (Yongsheng Huiyuan).
195. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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old incentive-based fees, but adapts to the regulatory change by using a
different structure.
It is worth pointing out that, although the “special trust interests”
arrangement looks more sophisticated than the idea of an
“encompassing management fee,” it is actually not new to Chinese
hedge funds. As far as I can see in my sample, the earliest contract
adopting a “special trust interests” arrangement is PureHeart China
Growth I Fund, established in May 2006 by Ping An Trust. The earlier
two funds managed by the same investment adviser, including China’s
very first hedge fund, PureHeart Fund, established in February 2004 by
SZITIC, used the direct wording of “performance-based compensation.”
It is not clear at this point why the third fund managed by the same
adviser used different treatment on this issue than its previous two
counterparts. A reasonable deduction may be that the name “special
trust interest” sounds milder to investors and fits better into the “trust”
context. After all, the hedge fund business was and still is novel in
China, and Chinese investors might find it difficult to accept that
someone can share as much as almost 20% of their profits simply by
providing “investment advice” to their trustee. Regardless, such an
arrangement apparently worked to mitigate the impact of the 2009 new
regulation on China’s hedge fund industry; otherwise the consequences
might have been much more severe. A related interesting finding is how
this arrangement has been made more sophisticated alongside the
development of sunshine funds. A typical variation to the original
“special beneficiary” treatment would give an investment adviser the
status of a “principal” of the trust, where it is appointed as the
“representative of all principals” by all the other investors by entering
into the contract. As such, the trust company has the obligation to
consult and listen to the “principals’ representative” in managing the
fund, and the investment adviser thus receives its “special trust interest”
based on such status and work.
3. Trust Company Designated Together with Investment Adviser as
Special Beneficiary to Share Special Trust Interests
The third alternative is based on a similar rationale as the second
one but the twist is elsewhere. Under this strategy, investors designate
both the investment adviser and the trust company as the special
beneficiaries of the sunshine trust fund. Since special trust interests can
be paid much more frequently as long as the fund’s new profits exceeds
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its high water mark, this solves the problem posed by the 2009 new
regulation that a trust company is only able to receive its flexible
compensation as of fund termination. Two funds have adopted this
strategy.196
4. Flexible Fees Payable Upon Investors’ Redemption
This is a partial compliance strategy, but nonetheless based on
reasonable grounds. After all, the trust company and investment adviser
will not be able to get their fees if their investors have already left the
fund by redemption. This strategy has been adopted by two funds.197
With these strategies adopted by Chinese sunshine funds, as
discussed above, it is no longer a mystery why the compliance rate for
the “flexible compensation payment upon fund termination”
requirement, as stipulated in the regulation promulgated in 2009198 is so
low at first sight. Chinese hedge funds emerged by borrowing from
foreign experience, but they grew with their own characteristics from
the very first day. They have shown remarkable competence to
overcome unfavorable regulatory limitations and find new ways for
further development of the business. Of course, it remains to be seen
how the regulatory authorities will react to these apparent circumvention
strategies of sunshine funds, and, more generally, how Chinese
regulatory authorities are going to define their role in the regulation of
hedge funds. New and interesting findings may be generated by further
research when the industry is more mature structurally and when the
regulatory framework is more developed.
CONCLUSION
While the hedge funds industry is already a trillion dollar business
in the developed world, it is still in its infancy stage in China. Organized
as trusts, Chinese hedge funds take drastically different business forms
than LPs, making it more difficult for researchers to understand them.
This is a very interesting area that has not been researched thoroughly,

196.
197.
198.

These two funds are: CITIC He Ju No. 1, and CITIC He Ying No. 1.
These two funds are CQITIC Chuan Shi No. 1, and ZRTrust Hun Dun No. 2.
See supra notes 165-67.

138

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

and this article is, to my knowledge, the first research exploring the
contractual arrangements of Chinese hedge fund agreements.
Using 139 contracts and explanations of trust plans of sunshine
funds collected by hand based on the list of securities investment trusts
provided by Go-Goal database, this article analyzed the structure,
covenants, and compensation mechanisms of sunshine funds. They have
been organized as trusts primarily because private fund managers cannot
legally pool capital from investors, and a trust was thus far the most
appropriate platform offered under the Chinese regulatory framework
for that purpose. As the article demonstrates, on the one hand, sunshine
funds do have similar contractual arrangements as typical LP-organized
hedge funds, such as charging, on top of a fixed management fee, a
performance-based compensation, which also largely cluster at 20%. On
the other hand, they are also undeniably different from LP-organized
hedge funds, due to jurisdiction-specific characteristics of China. The
most crucial difference is the involvement of the trust company in the
fund. Normally, it is merely a transaction executor responsible for
carrying out investment orders from the investment adviser. The trust
company also shares with the investment adviser a small portion of
performance-based compensation in exchange for such services to the
fund. However, because relying on trust companies has been the only
practical way for Chinese hedge fund managers to conduct the business,
and trust companies are the real contractual parties signing the trust
contracts with investors, investment advisers also need to accept certain
conditions that are much more stringent than mere profit sharing, such
as a higher level of fund manager capital contribution and narrowed
decision making power. Typically, an investment adviser (de facto
manager) to a sunshine fund in China is required to contribute or hold at
least 10% of the fund’s total assets. If a fund fails to perform well, the
trust company retains the power to sell all of the fund’s assets and
terminate the fund without consulting with the investment adviser.
Although harsh and even incentive dampening, these Chinaspecific covenants and arrangements in sunshine funds contracts are
unlikely to be eliminated as long as trust companies remain involved.
This is because trust companies require some measures to protect their
pecuniary interests and reputational capital from being hurt as a result of
acting as a direct contractual party with investors. Moreover, given the
deep-rooted influence of civil law tradition and that hedge funds are still
mostly unheard of, Chinese investors may find it difficult to accept
certain highly contractual arrangements. Rather, they would prefer
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something more straightforward and consistent with their past
experience, even if the former is more incentive-aligning and the latter is
incentive-twisting on the part of the investment adviser. A typical
example is that Chinese sunshine funds abandon in their contracts the
arrangement of nominal general partner capital contribution and big
performance-based compensation. It is the regulatory and institutional
settings that shaped the contractual covenants in sunshine fund
agreements.
It remains to be seen how the Chinese hedge funds industry will
develop in the future. At present, many new things are being attempted,
and new regulations are frequently being promulgated, yet at a low level
of consistency and, apparently, lacking in-depth consideration.
Emerging as an alternative investment vehicle and originated from the
gray regulatory areas, Chinese sunshine funds have demonstrated
remarkable competence by taking advantage of favorable legal
provisions and apparently adapting to unfavorable ones. Currently, the
industry is expecting to see how the newly materialized limited
partnership would shape the future development of hedge funds in China.
It is critical that regulators achieve a proper balance in regulating
China’s hedge fund industry.

